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BRANCH OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR: THE
NEW ROLE OF THE CORPORATION IN
BUSINESS CRIME PROSECUTIONS*
HARRY FIRST"

The Article describes the evolution of the public corporation's
role in the criminaljustice process-from potential defendant to
"branch office of the prosecutor," partnering with the
government in investigating business crime-and assesses the
impact of this evolution on criminaljustice policy.
The first part of the Article describes the branch-office role,
tracing its development back to the 1970s, and shows how it has
come to be routine for public corporations to assistprosecutors
in their investigations. The second part of the Article discusses
the implications of this shift in institutionalrole. The Article first
argues that the public corporation'sbranch-office role is likely to
be a durable one because it benefits both corporations and
prosecutors, effectively exploiting the misalignment of interests
between the corporation and its employees and providing
substantial efficiency gains to prosecutors. The Article next
examines the effect of this new role on legal rules, arguing that
the protections of the corporate attorney-client privilege should
not be increased nor constitutional constraintsimposed when the
corporation is acting in its branch-office role. The Article then
examines the potential effect of the new role on prosecutors'
willingness to bring criminal charges against corporations and,
ultimately, on deterrence in business crime cases. The Article
argues that the danger of this new role lies primarily in these
areas. The new branch-office role, with its tools of amnesty,
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agreements not to prosecute, and agreements to defer
prosecution, provides a middle ground for prosecutors between
declination and prosecution. This middle ground may prove
overly attractive to prosecutors, increasing their ability to
prosecute corporate executives, but cutting down on first-offense
prosecutions against corporations, likely the most critical for
deterring corporations from committing business crimes.
Although pursuing criminal charges against executives and
employees can certainly be an effective deterrent to business
crime, it is not a sufficient one. A credible threat of corporate
criminal liability is necessary to assure overall deterrence, as well
as to assure that corporations continue to have an incentive to
play this important branch-office role in investigating complex
business crime cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Our duty [in the Department of Justice] is to enforce the lawduties not all that different from the duties of a corporate officer
or director....
The faithful execution of these duties by corporate leadership
serves the same values in promoting public trust and confidence
that our criminalprosecutionsare designed to serve ....
There must also be integrity in what the company does when
investigating misconduct. In internal investigations of corporate
wrongdoing, corporate counsels play a quasi-public role, not
because they are an arm of the prosecutor,but because they are
acting on behalf of their investors and must vindicate the good
name of the company.

-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty,
December 12, 2006'
These corporations do not care about your criminal statutes
aimed at their servants. They could give up at once one or two or
three of their servants to bear this penalty for them. But when
you strike at their powers, at their franchises, at their corporate
existence, when you deal with them directly, then they begin to
feel the power of the Government.

-Senator John Sherman, March 24, 18902
For more than a century, legislators and prosecutors have been
trying to determine the best way to control improper business
behavior. One path chosen, starting with the enactment of the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 ("Sherman Act"),' has been to use the
criminal law, penalizing both the individual actor who engages in
illegal behavior and the entity on whose behalf the individual is
acting. Congress made this policy decision, however, with little
appreciation for the problems it would create and with little thought
1. Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the Lawyers for Civil
Justice Membership Conference Regarding the Department's Charging Guidelines in
Corporate Fraud Prosecutions (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/archivel
dag/speeches/2006/ dag-speech_061212.htm.
2. 21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890).
3. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 (defining "person" in the Sherman Act to include "corporations
and associations").
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as to why or when it might be useful to punish both the actor and the
entity, or when it might be preferable to choose only one or the other.
We continue to struggle with these basic questions today, and the
very idea of making an entity a target of criminal prosecution and
punishment remains controversial.'
For nearly three-quarters of a century after the passage of the
Sherman Act, however, the issues of individual and entity liability in
business crime cases were a low-level policy concern. After early
business crime prosecutions sorted out the basic questions of entity
liability and constitutional privileges,' the use of the criminal law to
deal with economic behavior receded. Academics criticized this
general prosecutorial neglect, but with little effect.'
Then in the late 1970s, things began to change, although the signs
were hard to decipher at the time. In 1977, Congress passed the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,' making foreign bribery illegal, but
few corporate prosecutions followed. 9 In 1984, the Justice

5. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, ControllingCorporate Misconduct:
An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 692-93 (1997)
(arguing that although individual liability produces optimal deterrence in some cases,
corporate liability is generally needed because individual agents may be judgment-proof
or it is too costly to sanction individual agents); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of
Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 474, 506, 525 (2006) (noting that the criminal
form of enterprise liability "remains of puzzling legitimacy," and arguing that the criminal
legal process adds a "unique and strong communicative force to any societal conclusion
about institutional fault" and that managers seek to avoid criminal liability because the
social stigma of criminal prosecution can harm a business firm's reputation); Vikramaditya
S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L.
REv. 1477, 1532-34 (1996) (arguing that noncriminal corporate liability regimes can
achieve deterrence at a lower cost).
6. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-96
(1909) (approving imposition of criminal liability on a corporate defendant); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70, 74-77 (1906) (deciding scope of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
protections for corporations); see also Henry W. Taft, The Tobacco Trust Decisions, 6
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 375-76 (1906) (stating that Hale "set at rest" Fourth and Fifth
Amendment issues relating to corporate conduct that had not previously been decided).
7. For the classic critique, see generally EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR

CRIME (1949) (arguing that white collar crime was largely ignored by prosecutors in the
early 20th century); see also, e.g., MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER,
CORPORATE CRIME (1980) (updating Sutherland's research and arguing that corporate
crime is still under-prosecuted).
8. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
9. There was only one corporate criminal prosecution in the Act's first four years.
See United States v. Kenney Int'l Corp., 2 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L., Inc.)
649, 651 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1979) (guilty plea for payment related to postage stamp
distribution in the Cook Islands); Ruth Aurora Witherspoon, Multinational Corporations
Governmental Regulation of Business Ethics Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
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Department's Antitrust Division filed ninety-six criminal antitrust
cases, mostly against local bid-riggers, a record; ninety-two
corporations were fined that year and thirty-two individuals were sent
to jail.10 In 1985, E.F. Hutton, then the country's fifth-largest
brokerage firm, pleaded guilty to 2,000 counts of mail and wire fraud
involving a systematic practice of overdrafting its bank accounts,
paying a fine of $2.75 million." Weakened by the case, and by
revelations of broader management problems, it was taken over two
years later by a rival brokerage company, Shearson Lehman
Brothers. 12 Between 1980 and 1987, the U.S. Attorney's Office in the
Southern District of New York filed sixty-three criminal insidertrading cases. In 1988, Drexel Burnham Lambert, another major
brokerage and investment firm, agreed to plead guilty to six felony
counts of mail, wire, and securities fraud and to pay $650 million in
fines and restitution.14 Michael Milken, the driving force behind
Drexel, was charged in a ninety-eight count indictment; he eventually
pleaded guilty and served twenty-two months in jail. 5 In 1990, Drexel
declared bankruptcy and ceased doing business.16
This slow but steady increase in business crime prosecutions
brought out a tension that had been present even in the early cases,

1977: An Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REV. 531, 551 (1983) (reporting eighty-five Department of
Justice investigations by 1981, resulting in one criminal prosecution and two civil cases).
10. See Antitrust Division's Workload Statistics During the 1980s, [Jan.-June] 58
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1449, at 109, 112, 115 (Jan. 18, 1990).
11. See Nathaniel C. Nash, E.F. Hutton Guilty in Bank Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1985, at Al.
12. See Robert J. Cole, Hutton-Shearson Deal Announced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1987,
at D4; see also Scott McMurray & Andy Pasztor, Growing Problems: Hutton Group
Suffers a Series of Reverses in Wake of Overdrafts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1986, at 1
(describing Hutton's managerial problems); James Sterngold, E.F. Hutton, Losing TwoYear Struggle, is Looking for Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1987, at Al (reporting that
Hutton's value was affected by fallout from overdrafting case and recent stock market
decline).
13. See 1 CORP. CRIME REP., Apr. 13, 1987.
14. James B. Stewart et al., Drexel Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay Out a Record $650
Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1988, at Al.
15. See Laurie P. Cohen, Milken's Stiff 10-Year Sentence is Filled with Incentives to
Cooperate with U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1990, at A3 (reporting Milken's sentence);
Laurie P. Cohen, Public Confession: Milken Pleads Guilty to Six Felony Counts and Issues
an Apology, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1990, at Al (reporting the entry of Milken's plea);
Laurie P. Cohen & Stephen J. Adler, The Other Shoe: Indicting Milken, U.S. Demands
$1.2 Billion of Financier'sAssets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1989, at Al (reporting Milken's
indictment); Jonathan M. Moses & Amy Stevens, Milken is Released to Halfway House in
Los Angeles Area, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1993, at B6 (reporting completion of prison term).
16. See Michael Siconolfi et al., Rise and Fall: Wall Street Era Ends as Drexel
Burnham Decides to Liquidate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at Al.
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but had never been quite so apparent: the interests of the
organization and its employees are not necessarily aligned when it
comes to a criminal prosecution. Organizations might prefer to blame
the employee and not pay a penalty, while the employee might prefer
to blame the organization and not go to jail. Given the fact that
business crime legislation never specifies which "person" to charge
criminally, prosecutors have the opportunity to exploit this
divergence of interest to further their ability to investigate and
prosecute business crimes. Although the early prosecutorial approach
was to turn employees against their corporations," the current trend
is otherwise. Beginning with the investigations that triggered the
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, prosecutors have
tended to enlist corporations more often than individuals, to the point
that corporations have gradually become a critical institution in the
investigation of business crime. In essence, the public corporation has
now become a branch office of the prosecutor.
The importance of this branch-office role can be seen clearly in
two recent business crime investigations. The first is the investigation
into improper backdating of stock options for executives. Options
backdating occurs when a company changes the date for the option's
exercise price from the original date to a date when the stock was
selling below the current market price, making the option holder an
instant winner when the stock is sold at the market price, "the Perfect
Payday," as the Wall Street Journal has called it.19 A newspaper
account of this practice sparked Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") scrutiny in 2003.20 After the publication of an important

17. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-70 (1906) (upholding constitutionality of
grant of immunity to Secretary and Treasurer of potential corporate criminal defendant);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 609-10 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of grant of
immunity to railroad's auditor in an investigation of the railroad's illegal rebating
practices, where witness claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege for the purpose of
shielding the railway or its officers from answering a charge of having violated the
Interstate Commerce Act's provisions).
18. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
19. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
2006, at Al (describing stock option grants at a number of companies). For a concise
description of stock options and the problems that backdating can raise, see Affidavit of
Kevin Riordan in Support of Arrest Warrants at 6-9, United States v. Alexander, No. M06-817 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2006) [hereinafter Riordan Affidavit], available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/20060809-ComverseSignedComplaintAl
exander.pdf.
20. See James Bandler & Kara Scannell, In Options Probes, Private Law Firms Play
CrucialRole, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28-29, 2006, at Al.
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scholarly article' and more detailed newspaper accounts,22 the SEC
and various U.S. attorneys' offices began investigating these grants,
eventually looking into stock option granting practices at more than
130 companies. 23 An investigation of this scope requires massive
resources, but the government did not rely solely on its own limited
staffs. Instead, the government used the options-issuing companies
themselves, relying on these firms' willingness to do their own
internal investigations, some of which have required substantial
effort. 24 The SEC even set up a computer tracking system to follow
the efforts of the various law firms performing these internal
investigations, as a way to check the independence of these firms and
the credibility of their findings.2
The link between these internal investigations and the
subsequent criminal prosecution can be seen in the backdating case
involving Comverse Technology (a maker of telecommunications
software) and three of its former officers, the Chief Executive Officer
("CEO"), Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), and senior general
counsel.26 Comverse's inside lawyers investigated the backdating, as
did an outside law firm that Comverse hired.27 In the course of these
investigations, the three officers made statements to the lawyers
confessing their wrongdoing.2 8 After the company turned these
statements over to the U.S. attorney, the statements became key
recitals in the affidavit supporting arrest warrants for the three
individuals.29 The CEO fled the country, but the other two officers
pleaded guilty.30 Comverse was never charged.

21. Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 810
(2005) (concluding that abnormal stock returns both before and after options' award dates
can best be explained by ex post facto award timing, unless "executives' ability to forecast
future price patterns is uncanny," based on statistical study of stock option grants).
22. See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 19; Bandler & Scannell, supra note 20.
23. See generally Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2007) (listing
companies that have been investigated for stock options grant practices) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
24. See Bandler & Scannell, supra note 20 (reporting that UnitedHealth's internal
investigation examined nearly four million documents and interviewed eighty employees
and other witnesses and that Mercury Interactive's investigation reportedly cost
approximately $70 million).
25. See id.
26. See id. (discussing the internal investigation).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Riordan Affidavit, supra note 19 at 41-42, 45-50; see also id. at 46 n.49 (stating
"CTI [Comverse] has provided the government with information about the defendants'
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The second example involves the investigation that HewlettPackard ("H-P") undertook to determine who had leaked
information to the press about H-P Board meetings. 3' In the course of
this investigation, H-P used "pretexting" (calling the telephone
company and falsely claiming to be the telephone company's
customer) to get telephone records of suspected directors and
newspaper reporters.32 H-P subsequently conducted an investigation
of the pretexting effort-as did Congress, the California State
Attorney General, and the U.S. Attorney's Office 3 3-eventually
giving the state attorney general more than 5,000 pages of internal
records, including emails.34 The Attorney General's Office was also
able to get copies of memoranda that H-P's outside counsel had
prepared during its investigation of the pretexting, memoranda that
detailed interviews with the main players in the pretexting effort.35 As
in the Comverse investigation, information obtained from H-P
formed a critical part of the declaration supporting the arrest
warrants, in this case for H-P's chairman, Patricia Dunn, and for an
H-P lawyer. The declaration reported that H-P "admitted" that it had
obtained telephone record information for twelve persons "without
the subscribers [sic] consent."36 The declaration also quoted an email
from Dunn to the lawyer that she "came away with a good sense of

statements to the Special Committee" of CTI's Board of Directors that had conducted the
internal investigation).
30. See Paul Davies, A Second Comverse Ex-Executive Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 2006, at A3 (reporting on William Sorin, former general counsel); Paul Davies,
Comverse's Former Finance Chief Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2006, at C3. Sorin
was subsequently sentenced to one year and one day in jail, the first corporate executive to
be sentenced in the options backdating investigations. See Chad Bray, Former Comverse
Official Receives Prison Term in Options Case, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2007, at A6.
31. See Alan Murray, Directors Cut: H-P Board Clash Over Leaks Triggers Angry
Resignation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,2006, at Al.
32. For a more general description of the practice, see John R. Emshwiller, Old Trick:
Hewlett-Packard was Farfrom First to Try 'Pretexting,' WALL ST. J., Dec. 16-17, 2006, at
Al.
33. See Jim Carlton & John R. Emshwiller, H-P's Leak Probe Comes Under Wider
Scrutiny: Justice Department, FBI, House Panel to Examine 'Pretexting' Inquiry Tactics,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2006, at A3.
34. See Declaration of Robert Morgester in Support of Felony Complaint and Arrest
Warrant at 3, People v. Dunn, No. CC644296 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2006) [hereinafter
Morgester Declaration].
35. See Peter Waldman & Don Clark, California Charges Dunn, 4 Others in H-P
Scandal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at Al (reporting that although H-P resisted turning
over the results of the internal investigation, the Attorney General's office was able to
obtain 700 pages of documents from congressional investigators to whom H-P had given
them).
36. Morgester Declaration, supra note 34, at 5.
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what you and the team are doing" and indicated that the lawyer
informed Dunn of the pretexting effort through "conversations,
emails, and weekly briefings."37 Dunn and the lawyer were charged in
a four-count state felony complaint.38 H-P was never charged.
Commentators have often taken a critical view of the public
corporation's new role in investigating its own crimes, colorfully
describing companies like Comverse and H-P as "doing the
equivalent of Maoist self-criticisms and turning the results over to the
authorities."3 This Article argues otherwise. This new role offers
substantial benefits both to corporations and prosecutors, effectively
exploiting the misalignment of interests between the corporation and
its employees and providing important efficiency gains to prosecutors.
The danger of the new role lies not in some coercive effect on
corporations; rather, the danger is that the branch-office role may
affect prosecutors' views of the merits of corporate criminal liability
and adversely impact deterrence in business crime cases.
To set these policy arguments in context, Part I of the Article
traces the evolution of the corporation's branch-office role. This
history is divided into three periods: (1) the "early period," from the
1970s to the end of the 1990s, when the key roles were played by the
SEC, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice; (2) the "Enron Era," from 2001 to 2006,
when the Justice Department articulated guidelines for corporate
criminal prosecutions and developed a new prosecutorial tool, the
non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreement; and (3) the
current period, when prosecutorial enthusiasm for business crime
prosecutions may have cooled, but the branch-office role remains
undiminished.
Part II of the Article sets out the policy arguments. It examines
four questions: (1) Does economic theory shed light on the durability
of the institutional shift to the branch-office role? (2) What are the
implications of this shift for the legal rules regarding the prosecution
and investigation of business crime cases? (3) How might this shift
37. See id. at 6-7.
38. See Complaint at 1, 5-6, People v. Dunn, No. 061027481 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4,
2006),
available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms06/06-087Oa.pdf.
For later
developments, see Peter Waldman & Christopher Lawton, H-P Case Fizzles in State
Court, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2007, at A3 (discussing the dismissal of charges against Dunn
and the acceptance agreement from three other defendants not to contest a misdemeanor
charge; state had previously dismissed charges against one defendant after he pleaded
guilty to federal charges and the fedeial investigation was reported as continuing).

39. See, e.g., Bandler & Scannell, supra note 20 (quoting Professor Joseph Grundfest,
former SEC commissioner).
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affect the willingness of prosecutors to bring criminal cases against
corporations? (4) How might this shift affect deterrence in business
crime cases? This Part will argue that the institutional shift is likely to
be durable; that legal rules regarding review of agreements with
prosecutors, the protections of the attorney-client privilege, and
constitutional protections should not be adjusted to reflect this new
role; that the new branch-office role might very well lead prosecutors
to cut back on bringing criminal charges against corporations; and
that over-use of the branch-office role could end up reducing
deterrence in business crime cases. The Article concludes by stressing
the importance of using the criminal sanction against corporations for
business crime violations.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATION'S ROLE

A.

The Early Period

The role that corporations have come to play in the criminal
process today can be traced back to the SEC's investigations in the
early 1970s of "questionable payments."40 At first, the payments being
investigated were illegal corporate campaign contributions made
during the 1972 presidential campaign, contributions whose existence
was uncovered by the Watergate special prosecutor. 41 The SEC's
investigations, however, soon revealed a broader problem of
corporate commercial bribery taking place both in the United States
and abroad. Just as with today's options backdating problem, the SEC
quickly found that it lacked the resources to pursue careful
investigations of all the cases that were being uncovered.42 Drawing
on its experience in negotiating consent decrees in fraud cases that
required corporations to undertake internal reviews by courtappointed outside counsel, the SEC began to encourage companies to
perform internal reviews before the SEC took action and to reveal

40. Payments made at this time by U.S. companies to secure business abroad were
often euphemistically called "questionable payments," rather than "bribes." See John C.
Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of CorporateMisconduct
and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1102 nn.2-4, 1103 n.7, 1105 nn.1112 (1977) (citations omitted).
41. See id. at 1115-16.
42. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 800-01 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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the results of those reviews, where necessary, to the Commission.43
Thus was born the Commission's "Voluntary Disclosure Program.""
Pressing corporations to undertake ex ante reviews not only
helped the Commission; corporations reaped the benefits of these
reviews as well. As one of the key practitioners of the day put it,
corporations saw that it might be "more prudent" to engage in private
investigation without court supervision or SEC monitoring,
undertaken by counsel of their own choice.45 Further, by putting its
"corporate house in order" on its own, a corporation might be able to
negotiate a "milder settlement" with the SEC.46
The increase in these internal investigations then triggered a
renewed attention to the question of the corporation's attorney-client
and work-product privileges. Before the 1970s, the extent to which
these privileges protected corporations had received only sporadic
lower court attention47 : the Supreme Court had not considered the
corporate attorney-client privilege since 1915 and had never
considered the application of the work-product doctrine in the
corporate criminal context.48
In 1976, the outside accountants for the Upjohn Company, a
pharmaceutical manufacturer, discovered that a foreign Upjohn
subsidiary had made improper payments to foreign government
officials. 9 Upjohn reported this discovery to its general counsel and
the company undertook an internal investigation of the payments."
43. See Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655,
661-62 (1984).
44. See Coffee, supranote 40, at 1117.
45. See Mathews, supra note 43, at 666.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492-93 (7th Cir.
1970) (adopting "subject matter" test for coverage of communications under the corporate
attorney-client privilege), affd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (equally divided court); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (holding that a
corporation was not entitled to assert attorney-client privilege), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th
Cir. 1963); City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.
1962) (adopting the "control group" test).
48. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336-37 (1915)
(noting that the Government "frankly admitted" that Congress did not intend the ICC's
subpoena power to include confidential correspondence between the railroad and its
counsel, the Court observed: "The desirability of protecting confidential communications
between attorney and client as a matter of public policy is too well known and has been
too often recognized by textbooks and courts to need extended comment now. If such
communications were required to be made the subject of examination and publication,
such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice and
assistance.").
49. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
50. See id. at 386-87.
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Upjohn subsequently made a report to the SEC disclosing the
payments, after which the Internal Revenue Service sought all of
Upjohn's documents relating to its investigation of the payments (the
payments raised tax problems because they should not have been
treated as deductible business expenses), including interviews with its
employees." Upjohn resisted. In Upjohn Co. v. United States,52 the
Supreme Court held that Upjohn could assert the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine in an effort to shield these
documents from government discovery, although the Court declined
to set out any specific tests for the assertion of these privileges. 3
Upjohn is a somewhat paradoxical marker in the development of
the corporation's branch-office role. On the one hand, permitting the
assertion of these privileges would seem to run counter to viewing the
corporation as having public responsibilities because the privileges
shield information from government scrutiny. Although it is true that
the privileges shield only the specific communication of the
information, not the underlying information itself,54 keeping
communications confidential deprives the government of material
that could be quite useful in an investigation or prosecution, if only to
cross-examine witnesses who might later change their stories. On the
other hand, acknowledging a strong privilege gives some comfort to
corporations when they engage in internal reviews, arguably
providing an incentive for corporations to engage in thorough selfinvestigation and self-policing without fear that the investigation itself
could create liability. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that an
inhospitable approach to these privileges "threatens to limit the
valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's
compliance with the law."" This self-regulatory message was the one
that corporate counsel took from the case when it was decided.56
The next step toward developing the branch-office role of
corporations was to institutionalize the private internal investigation.
If there were potential benefits from engaging in such investigations
when a government agency had focused on the widespread
occurrence of a particular corporate practice, perhaps there would be
51. See id. at 387-88.
52. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
53. See id. at 396-97. For further discussion of the factual context of the case, see John
E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 457-59 (1982).
54. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395.
55. Id. at 392.
56. See Sexton, supra note 53, at 468-76.
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greater benefits from putting into place programs that could more
generally prevent criminal behavior in the first place, or at least more
certainly detect it. Some major corporations had instituted such
programs after the electrical equipment criminal antitrust
prosecutions of the 1960s,11 variously called "compliance programs"
or "codes of ethics," but corporate counsel now saw the possibility
that criminal liability might extend beyond a few specific business
crime statutes to a wider range of corporate behavior. The legal
advice of the day thus stressed that "[t]he past decade has been
marked with a dizzying expansion of potential corporate liability,
particularly corporate criminal liability" and that "[e]ffective
self-regulation could provide a measure of protection" in this hostile
legal environment." Indeed, compliance programs could "foster
public goodwill," allowing a public company "to be perceived as a
law-abiding corporate citizen rather than as a company that does not
care."5 9 Further, counsel also saw that there could be a connection
between the adoption of compliance programs and the legal standard
that courts might apply in determining corporate criminal liability.
Compliance programs, if reviewed under a due diligence standard,
might lead courts to "base criminal liability on some showing of
corporate recalcitrance rather than upon one employee's actions,"
thereby limiting prosecutions to cases where the corporation had
"fostered an atmosphere conducive to criminal activity.""o Thus, the
programs carried a dual hope: (1) to reduce illegal behavior in the
first place and (2) to reduce the likelihood of corporate criminal
liability in the event that corporate employees did engage in illegal
conduct.
57. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559,
1578 (1990). This interest in corporate compliance programs came notwithstanding the
fact that General Electric, one of the major defendants in the criminal prosecution, had a
"formal company policy rule" to avoid discussions of pricing. See Myron W. Watkins,
Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Their Implications for Government and for Business,
29 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 105 (1961).
58. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 57, at 1561.
59. Id. at 1635-36.
60. Id. at 1652. The standard rule is that entities are criminally liable for the conduct
of their employees, undertaken within the scope of their employment for the benefit of the
entity. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909).
In applying the rule, courts have resisted taking account of compliance programs. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972). For a review of
the current approach to finding entity criminal liability, see Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits
on ProsecutorialDiscretion in Corporate ProsecutionAgreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434,
1445-48 (2007). For an argument that the "for the benefit" part of the New York Central
test should be more strictly applied, see Buell, supra note 5, at 530-32.
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The movement to institutionalize compliance programs received
further support from the United States Sentencing Commission
("Commission") in 1991. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
the Commission was required to write sentencing guidelines applying
both to individuals and to organizations.62 The Commission began
with guidelines for individuals, which it issued in 1987, and then
turned its attention to organizational guidelines.' In 1988, the
Commission proposed organizational guidelines based on a theory of
optimal deterrence, with fines keyed to the loss caused by the illegal
behavior and the difficulty of detecting and punishing particular
offenses.' Those guidelines were not well-received, and the
Commission subsequently changed its approach: the guidelines it
finally adopted in 1991 were aimed more at culpability and
remediation than at optimal deterrence.'
The guidelines' focus on culpability and remediation led to
several important provisions which drew on then-current trends and
incrementally advanced the corporation's branch-office role. As with
the earlier draft guidelines, the 1991 guidelines began by assessing the
harm caused by the illegal behavior.66 The 1991 guidelines, however,
then reduced the fine to reflect lesser culpability.67 One significant
way an organization could obtain such a reduction would be to have
adopted an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of
law" prior to the commission of the criminal offense.68 Another
significant source of reduction was for an organization to report
61. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2006).
63. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing the
adoption of the first set of guidelines for individuals).
64. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DISCUSSION DRAFT OF SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS FOR ORGANIZATIONS (July 1988), reprinted in
10 WHITTIER L. REV. 7, 58-61 (1988). For an explanation of optimal deterrence theory,
see generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983).
65. See generally Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Corporations:Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings,and Some
Thoughts about Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 205 (1993) (discussing criticisms of the
draft guidelines' optimal deterrence approach and the guidelines that the Commission
subsequently adopted).
66. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4 (1991).
67. See id. § 8C2.5.
68. See id. § 8C2.5(f). The Commission revised the original guidelines provision in
2004, inter alia, changing "Effective Program to Prevent and Detect Violations of Law" to
"Effective Compliance and Ethics Program." Id. § 8C2.5(f) app. C.

2010]

BRANCH OFFICEOF THE PROSECUTOR

37

violations promptly (and before they were known to the government)
and/or to "fully cooperate[]" in the investigation and show
"affirmative acceptance of responsibility" for its criminal conduct. 9
An organization that qualified for the maximum "discounts" could, in
theory, obtain a ninety-five percent reduction in the fine that would
otherwise be imposed. 70
The 1991 guidelines also envisioned the possibility of placing
organizations on court-supervised probation for up to five years, part
of an effort to use the criminal sanction to remedy past harm.7 1 One
recommended condition of probation was to require the adoption of a
compliance program approved by the court, along with periodic
reporting to the court of compliance efforts and periodic visits by
probation officers or other "experts." 72 Conditions of probation could
also include restitution to victims 73 and "community service."74
The final critical step in this period came when the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice ("Division") changed its
previously existing amnesty program for those involved in criminal
bid-rigging or price fixing." Although the Division historically had
been willing to forgo criminal prosecutions in appropriate
circumstances, defense counsel generally considered applying for
amnesty to be a risky proposition, and the program was not often
used.6 In 1993, however, the Division instituted a more articulated
69. Id. § 8C2.5(g).
70. See id. § 8C2.6.
71. See id. § 8D1.1.
72. See id. § 8D1.4(b)(2).
73. See id. § 8B1.1.
74. See id. § 811.3.
75. See generally Donald C. Klawiter, CorporateLeniency in the Age of International
Cartels: The American Experience, 14 ANTITRUST, no. 3, 2000 at 13 (discussing the
Antitrust Division's amnesty program, formally begun in 1978, and its application only to
cases where the Division had not begun an investigation). Although section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), does not specify which restraints of trade should be
prosecuted criminally, price fixing and bid-rigging have generally been considered
appropriate subjects for criminal prosecution under section 1. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST Div. MANUAL 111-20 (4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/divisionmanual/atrdivman.pdf; United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
439-40 (1978) (discussing earlier views). Other anticompetitive conduct has, on occasion,
been criminally prosecuted as well. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 783 (1946) (involving monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act); United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1972) (boycott under section
1). While the Department's amnesty program does not specify the "illegal antitrust
activity" to which it applies, see ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE
LENIENCY POLICY 1 (1993), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf, there
are no reports of its application outside of conduct involving price fixing or bid-rigging.
76. See Klawiter,supra note 75, at 13.
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program.77 Critical was the provision for full amnesty for a company
that was first to report illegal activity even if the investigation had
already begun, so long as the Department did not yet have sufficient
evidence for a conviction and the reporting company met a number of
conditions, including reporting "with candor and completeness" and
providing "full, continuing and complete cooperation that advances
the Division in its investigation."7 The Division also provided that
corporate officers, directors, and employees of the reporting
corporation would get amnesty, if they admitted their wrongdoing
and continued to assist the Division. 9 The new program was
immediately successful, with twelve corporations coming forward to
cooperate in the first year, in comparison to the one corporation per
year, on average, that had come forward before the program was
instituted. 0
The Antitrust Division's amnesty program provided clearer and
more powerful incentives for corporate cooperation than other policy
instruments then in use. For example, the sentencing guidelines'
penalty reductions applied only after a corporation had been
convicted (with the attendant potential for collateral consequences),
thereby reducing the value of corporate efforts to self-investigate and
report illegal behavior. Likewise, the SEC's earlier efforts to
encourage corporate compliance did not guarantee that the SEC
would take no action, although it held out the potential for reduced
sanctions." Perhaps more importantly, the SEC's policy did not affect
the conduct of U.S. attorneys around the country, who remained free
to exercise prosecutorial discretion to bring criminal charges without
regard to the SEC's actions.82 Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s,
77. See id. at 13-14; accord ANTITRUST Div., supra note 75 (explaining the program
requirements).
78. See ANTITRUST Div., supra note 75, § B. Under the Division's policy, amnesty is
easier to get where the Department does not yet know about the illegal activity. See id.
§ A.
79. See id. § C. One year later, the Department announced an amnesty program for
individuals who report illegal activity on their own, rather than in connection with a
corporate proffer of cooperation. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDIVIDUAL LENIENCY
POLICY § A (1994), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ guidelines/0092.htm.
80. See 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1676, at 183 (Aug. 11, 1994).
81. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing the SEC
program).
82. Cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980) (prosecution of an
individual for insider trading after entering into a consent decree with the SEC disgorging
profits from the illegal trading). For a description of how one corporation convinced the
U.S. attorney not to indict it for insider trading, despite the fact that key executives had
already been arrested on insider trading charges, see James B. Stewart & Janet Guyon,
Damage Control: How GE and Kidder Managed to Ward Off an Impending Disaster,
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the movement to reward corporations, in one way or another, for
revealing their crimes and helping the prosecution was well
underway.
B.

The Enron Era:2001-2006

1. The Scandals Emerge
The next steps in developing the branch-office role of
corporations came in what can be called the Enron era, dated 2001 to
2006. Five years might not be sufficient time to qualify as an "era,"
but this is roughly the time period when prosecutors, legislators,
courts, and (often) juries reacted strongly to the unfolding stories of
corporate wrongdoing. During this time, prosecutors used the earlier
developments-compliance programs, reporting illegality to the
government, full cooperation, and assistance-to deal with the
emergence of a new wave of corporate accounting and other scandals.
Enron was not the only corporation to be involved in this widespread
fraud, but its name has come to symbolize the problems that were
uncovered during this time.
The era began quietly. In August 2001, Jeffrey Skilling, the CEO
of Enron, then the seventh largest U.S. corporation, resigned from his
position after only six months on the job and with little explanation.
Two months later, Enron reported a third-quarter loss of $618 million
along with a reduction in shareholder equity of $1.2 billion to reflect
transactions with limited partnerships controlled by the company's
CFO, Andrew Fastow." Despite pleas for government financial help
that Enron's new CEO, Kenneth Lay, made to the highest officials in
the Bush Administration, no government rescue was forthcoming.s
Enron's admission in November 2001 that it had overstated profits for

WALL ST. J., June 8, 1987, at 1 (describing General Electric internal investigation of its
subsidiary, Kidder Peabody, and how its decision to "clean house" convinced U.S.
Attorney Rudolph Guiliani not to indict the corporation).
83. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 357, 360-61 (2003) (discussing Skilling's
resignation and reaction inside Enron).
84. See John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets
Generate Big Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl.
85. See Jeanne Cummings & Michael Schroeder, Enron's Lay Sought Cabinet
Officials' Help, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2002, at A3 (reporting contacts in October and
November 2001 between Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay, Alan Greenspan, Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neill, and Commerce Secretary Donald Evans).
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the previous five years by $586 million sealed its fate. In December
2001, Enron declared bankruptcy, at that time the largest bankruptcy
filing in U.S. history."
The next critical event occurred on March 14, 2002, when Arthur
Andersen LLP, Enron's auditing company, was indicted for
obstruction of justice arising out of its massive destruction of Enronrelated documents, allegedly done both before and after the SEC had
begun its investigation of Enron's accounting practices." David
Duncan, the Arthur Andersen partner in charge of auditing Enron,
pleaded guilty in April 2002 to obstruction of justice, thereby
strengthening the government's case against the accounting firm." On
June 15, 2002, after ten days of deliberation, the jury found Arthur
Andersen guilty.90 The eventual result was the collapse and
dissolution of the firm, even though three years later the Supreme
Court vacated Arthur Andersen's criminal conviction, and the
government chose not to retry the case.91
Enron and Arthur Andersen were not the only major
corporations to be caught in major accounting and securities frauds
during this era. The impressive group of major corporations involved
in frauds at the same time includes-Adelphia Communications:
questionable accounting practices, insider loans and guarantees of
$3.1 billion not approved by the board; Bristol-Myers: accounting
fraud involving manipulation of reserves and valuation of sales to
wholesalers; Cendant: accounting and securities fraud that inflated
earnings by several hundred million dollars; Computer Associates:
artificially inflating revenues and improperly rewarding top
executives; Dynegy: accounting practices to make cash flow appear

86. See John R. Emshwiller et al., Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 9, 2001, at A3.
87. See Rebecca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A3.
88. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fallfrom Grace, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 917, 921
(2003).
89. See id. at 930.
90. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 1.
91. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706-08 (2005) (holding
that the trial court's instructions did not correctly inform the jury of the mens rea required
to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)). In addition to deciding not to retry the
defunct firm, the government also did not object to a motion made by David Duncan, its
star cooperating witness in the Andersen case, to withdraw his guilty plea. See John R.
Emshwiller, Andersen Figure Files to Withdraw His Guilty Plea, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23,
2005, at C3; Carrie Johnson, U.S. Ends Prosecution of Arthur Andersen, WASH. POST,
Nov. 23,2005, at D1.
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greater than it was; Halliburton: investigation into improper
accounting for revenue from cost overruns on large projects; ImClone
Systems: former CEO trading in advance of FDA negative report on
major drug; Kmart: investigation into accounting practices; Lucent
Technologies: $679 million adjustment to revenues led to SEC
investigation; Merrill Lynch: paid $100 million in criminal fines to
state prosecutors, led by New York, for providing investment advice
through advisors whose incentives were to recommend Merrill Lynch
stocks without regard to merit; Qwest Communications: possible
inflation of revenues for 2000 and 2001 related to capacity swaps and
equipment sales; Tyco International: improper accounting practices
to boost profits and failure to report publicly excessive executive
compensation; Rite Aid: accounting fraud tactics inflated income by
more than $250 million; WorldCom: improper accounting of capital
expenses to inflate before-depreciation earnings, leading to
overstatement of earnings in excess of $7 billion; and Xerox: paid $10
million civil penalty to SEC for inflating revenue and profits from
1997 to 2000.92
2. Congressional Response
With the stock markets tumbling and more scandals emerging
following the Enron collapse, political pressure mounted for Congress
to take action. Congress's response was to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, passed by a near-unanimous vote in the House and Senate and
quickly signed into law by President Bush on July 30, 2002.93
Sarbanes-Oxley was an amalgam of various proposals aimed at
the specific abuses that had been uncovered. Among its more
important features were: (1) the establishment of a "Public Company
92. For the listed cases, see Brickey, supra note 83, at 382-401 app. A (listing
corporate fraud trials from March 2002 to August 2003); Ann Davis, Ex-Chairman of
Cendant is Indicted, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2001, at A3 (describing criminal charges brought
against former chairman and vice chairman of Cendant); Charles Gasparino, Merrill
Lynch to Pay Big Fine, Increase Oversight of Analysts, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at Al
(describing settlement of state charges against Merrill Lynch); Gardiner Harris, Booster
Shots: At Bristol-Myers, Ex-Executives Tell of Numbers Games, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,
2002, at Al (describing Bristol-Myers' accounting practices under investigation by SEC
and Justice Department); Scott Kilman, Rite Aid Ex-Officials Charged in AccountingFraud Probe, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at A2 (describing criminal charges brought
against three former Rite Aid executives); David Wessel, Venal Sins: Why the Bad Guys of
the Boardroom Emerged en Masse, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2002, at Al (listing
investigations).
93. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). For the votes, see 148 CONG.
REC. H5480 (daily ed. July 25, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7365 (daily ed. July 25, 2002).
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Accounting Oversight Board," with power to regulate auditing
companies to assure the independence of the audit and the following
of professional standards; 94 (2) a provision requiring an annual
assessment of the effectiveness of a company's "internal control
structure and procedures" for financial reporting;' (3) two separate
provisions requiring principal executive and financial officers to
certify annual and quarterly reports, with criminal liability for
certifying when "knowing" that the report does not "fairly present"
the financial condition of the company;96 (4) provisions for knowing
alteration or destruction of documents with intent to obstruct federal
investigation;' (5) a new crime of "securities fraud" that would be
easier to prosecute;98 (6) an increase in the penalties for violating the
1934 Securities Exchange Act and the mail and wire fraud statutes,
including directives to the United States Sentencing Commission to
increase penalties for serious frauds and obstruction of justice;9 9 and
(7) a requirement that the SEC issue rules for "minimum standards of
professional conduct" for lawyers practicing before the SEC,
including a requirement that lawyers report a client corporation's
securities law violations or breaches of fiduciary duty either to the
company's chief legal counsel or CEO, or, if they fail to act, to its
Board of Directors.10o
3. Executive Response
With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, there was the hope, as the
Chairman of the SEC, William Donaldson, said, that "we've seen the
worst of it.""o' Still, there was need for a prosecutorial response to
deal with the wrongdoing that had been disclosed, a response that
would likely require use of the criminal law. Paul O'Neill, secretary of

94. § 101, 116 Stat. at 750, invalidated in part by Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
95. § 404(a)(2), 116 Stat. at 789 (pertaining to public issuers).
96. § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777 (SEC regulation); § 906(a), 116 Stat. at 806 (criminal
procedure).
97. See § 802, 116 Stat. at 800 (criminal penalties for altering or destroying
documents); § 1101, 116 Stat. at 807 (criminal penalties for record tampering).
98. § 807, 116 Stat. at 804.
99. See § 805, 116 Stat. at 802 (reviewing sentencing guidelines); § 903, 116 Stat. at 805
(pertaining to mail and wire fraud); § 1106, 116 Stat. at 810 (addressing Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
100. §307, 116 Stat. 784. For SEC regulations, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2010).
101. See Press Briefing by SEC Chairman William Donaldson and Deputy Att'y Gen.
Larry Thompson (July 22, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftflpress/072203whitehouse
cftfbriefing.htm.
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the treasury and a former CEO himself, put it this way: the guilty
executives deserved "to hang ... from the very highest branches."10
On July 2, 2002, shortly before signing Sarbanes-Oxley into law,
President Bush signed an executive order establishing the Corporate
Fraud Task Force in the Department of Justice to coordinate the
investigation and prosecution of "financial crimes."103 The Task
Force's authority included the right to "allocat[e] and reallocat[e]"
resources within the Justice Department in an effort to coordinate
and centralize prosecution of these cases.' By the end of the Task
Force's first year, Justice Department prosecutors had obtained over
250 corporate fraud convictions (including guilty pleas) and had
charged and/or convicted at least twenty-five former CEOs."o5 By the
end of the Task Force's second year, it reported approximately 250
additional convictions, with corporate fraud charges pending in 400
filed cases against more than 900 defendants, sixty of whom were
corporate CEOs and presidents.106
The Task Force's directive to investigate corporate fraud raised
the obvious question of how prosecutors should deal with the
potential for corporate criminal liability. The only official guidance
available at the time was a 1999 memorandum entitled "Federal
Prosecution of Corporations," that Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder had issued during the Clinton administration.107 The Holder
Memorandum did nothing to require prosecutors to adhere to its
guidance-even the use of its discretionary factors was not
required.10 The guidelines set out in the memorandum, however, did
102. Wessel, supra note 92.
103. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002).
104. See id. §3b.
105. See CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, FIRST YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
2.2 (2003).
106. See CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 3.2 (2004).
107. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
All Component Heads and U.S. Att'ys (June 16, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/criminall
fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF [hereinafter Holder Memorandum].
For discussion of the Holder Memorandum, see Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D.
McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of Justice's Corporate Charging
Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 7-12 (characterizing the Holder Memorandum as a "littlenoticed memo").
108. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 107, at 1 ("These factors are, however, not
outcome-determinative and are only guidelines. Federal prosecutors are not required to
reference these factors in a particular case, nor are they required to document the weight
they accorded specific factors in reaching their decision .... [P]lease forward any
comments about the guidelines, as well as instances in which the factors proved useful or
not useful in specific cases . . . .").
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draw on three earlier developments in voluntary corporate
cooperation: (1) a corporation's "timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with the government's
investigation" could lead to the grant of "immunity or amnesty";'09 (2)
the existence of a compliance program "designed and implemented in
an effective manner" could result in a decision "to charge only the
corporation's employees and agents";..0 and (3) a corporation's
willingness to make restitution, accept responsibility, and discipline
wrongdoers "may [be] consider[ed] ... in determining whether to

charge the corporation.""
In January 2003, less than six months after the establishment of
the Corporate Fraud Task Force in the Justice Department, the
deputy attorney general of the Justice Department and head of the
Task Force, Larry Thompson, announced a revision of the Holder
Memorandum." 2 Thompson's introductory letter stated that the
"main focus of the revisions [was its] increased emphasis on and
scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation."1 3
Expressing concern that business organizations too often "purport[]
to cooperate with a Department investigation" while actually
"imped[ing] the quick and effective exposure of the complete scope
of wrongdoing under investigation," Thompson stated that such
obstructionist behavior would "weigh in favor of a corporate

prosecution."114
Despite the introductory tone indicating important changes from
the Holder Memorandum, the actual changes in the Thompson
Memorandum were rather slight. With regard to the critical indicia of
corporate cooperation that might merit prosecutorial discretion in the
charging decision, the Thompson Memorandum changed almost
nothing: a slight word change in the provision dealing with waivers of
attorney-client and work-product protections and no changes in the
provision expressing a negative view of corporations that protect
"culpable employees" by advancing their attorneys' fees, not firing
them, or sharing information with them through a joint defense

109. Id. § VI.A-B.
110. Id. § VII.B.
111. Id. § VIII.A.
112. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm. [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum].
113. Id.
114. Id.
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agreement." 5 If anything, there was a nuanced shift of emphasis away
from prosecuting corporations and toward prosecuting individuals.
For example, to the Holder Memorandum's eight general factors to
be considered in deciding whether to prosecute a corporation the
Thompson Memorandum added a ninth: "the adequacy of the
prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's
malfeasance."" 6 Instead of the statement in the Holder Memorandum
that individual criminal liability "provides a strong deterrent against
future corporate wrongdoing,""' the Thompson Memorandum states:
"[b]ecause a corporation can act only through individuals, imposition
of individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent
against future corporate wrongdoing.""'
What changed more than the language between the two
memoranda was the times. The Department had faced corporate
wrongdoing before 2002, of course, but the pressure had never before
been so great to demonstrate results. Issuing a new memorandum,
even though it was almost unchanged from the one issued in the
Clinton administration, underscored the new Bush administration's
seriousness of purpose. Nor was the preference for individual liability
over organizational liability surprising. Such a shift in emphasis had
been seen in the 1980s, when a republican administration replaced a
democratic one and corporate-centered questionable payment
investigations gave way to individually-centered insider trading
investigations." 9
The Department's focus on individual culpability was genuine,
however, and it was a natural step to make serious, if instrumental,
use of corporate resources in an effort to deal with the wrongdoing
that was making newspaper headlines. The tool that emerged to
115. The only real difference between the sections in the two memoranda was the
deletion of "only" in the Holder Memorandum. Compare Holder Memorandum, supra
note 107, § VI.B ("The Department does not, however, consider waiver of a corporation's
privileges an absolute requirement, and prosecutors should consider the willingness of a
corporation to waive the privileges when necessary to provide timely and complete
information as only one factor in evaluating the corporation's cooperation."), with
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 112 § VI.B ("The Department does not, however,
consider waiver of a corporation's privileges an absolute requirement, and prosecutors
should consider the willingness of a corporation to waive the privileges when necessary to
provide timely and complete information as one factor in evaluating the corporation's
cooperation.").
116. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 112, § II.A.
117. Holder Memorandum, supra note 107, § I.B.
118. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 112, § I.B.
119. See Kenneth B. Noble, The Dispute Over the S.E.C.: Critics Call Agency Less
Aggressive, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1982, at D1 (discussing change in enforcement policies).
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marshal this corporate effort was a formal agreement between a
corporation under investigation and the government prosecutor, an
agreement that has taken one of two basic forms. One form is the
"deferred prosecution agreement," in which the government files
charges but defers a decision on prosecution pending the
corporation's performance of agreed upon conditions; the other form
is the "non-prosecution agreement," in which the government agrees
not to prosecute the corporation at all in exchange for the
corporation's agreement to perform certain acts.120
At the core, these government/corporate agreements reflect a
familiar trade-off between a prosecutor and defendant-some degree
of immunity from prosecution (or reduction in sentence) in exchange
for cooperation-which hardly seems innovative. Indeed, prosecutors
had made sporadic use of these types of agreements prior to either
the Holder or Thompson memoranda. 12 1 The Holder Memorandum
included a discussion of the use of non-prosecution agreements;12 2 the
Thompson Memorandum simply added a reference to pretrial
diversion,'123 a procedure developed in the context of juvenile and
drug offenders where charges might be filed, but prosecution deferred
in an effort to avoid stigmatization and to encourage rehabilitation. 24
120. See Leonard Orland, The Transformationof Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 56 (2006) (describing differences between the two types of
agreements).
121. The earliest example of a fully framed deferred prosecution agreement in a fraud
case appears to be the 1994 agreement with Prudential Securities, in which Prudential
agreed to "cooperate fully" with government investigators, to add $330 million to an SEC
restitution fund, to appoint outside counsel to ensure that Prudential was complying with
the compliance-related directives that the SEC had imposed, and to appoint a new outside
director to act as compliance "ombudsman." See Letter Agreement from Mary Jo White,
U.S. Att'y, S. Dist. of N.Y., to Scott W. Muller, Esq., & Carrey R. Dunne, Esq. (Oct. 27,
1994), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/prudential.pdf. Accompanying
the letter agreement was a formal deferred prosecution agreement, filed in court with a
six-page criminal complaint charging Prudential with securities fraud, the prosecution of
which would be deferred for three years conditioned on "satisfactory compliance" with the
cooperation agreement. See id. at 1. The complaint alleged violations of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78j(b) and 78ff, and Rule 10b-5. See id. Three cases predate the Prudential agreement,
but one did not involve securities fraud and the other two did not include a formal nonprosecution agreement. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 107, at 36, 44 (agreements
with Armour of America and Aetna); Orland, supra note 120, at 58-59 (Solomon
Brothers' settlement, involving securities and antitrust violations, did not include formal
agreement).
122. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 107, § VI.B.
123. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 112, § VI.B.
124. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1863, 1866
(2005) (discussing antecedents of these agreements); Paulsen, supra note 60, at 1444 n.46
(discussing antecedents of deferred prosecution agreements). The 1997 U.S. Attorneys'
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The innovation in the use of these agreements has come through
practice, as prosecutors began to use these agreements more
frequently, in more major cases, to obtain more substantial relief. As
the agreements have evolved, they generally function in two different
ways: they create an agency relationship between the government and
the corporation, under which the corporation assumes certain
continuing efforts on behalf of the prosecution, and they structure
remediation, under which the corporation agrees to defined
undertakings to repair the harm caused and to prevent future
violations. Although there is no standard agreement, the agreements
generally impose some combination of the following conditions: (1)
an internal investigation; (2) a code of conduct and/or an effective
compliance program to "prevent or deter violations of the law"; (3)
corporate acceptance of responsibility; (4) the provision of specified
information to the government with "full candor and completeness";
(5) waivers of attorney-client and work-product protections; (6)
dismissals of errant employees; (7) a continuing duty to cooperate; (8)
payment of restitution and/or a fine; and (9) probation with the use of
continuing monitors, whose duties depend on the extent of the
remedial actions to which the corporation has agreed.125
The increased use of these agency/remedial agreements in highprofile cases began to draw considerable attention, and the very
concept of these agreements, along with certain provisions, such as
attorney-client privilege waivers and corporate monitoring, has
proved deeply controversial. 26 Despite the increased attention and
Manual included guidelines for pretrial diversion. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATIORNEYS' MANUAL 9-22.010 (1997) (listing three objectives of pretrial diversion:
"prevent future criminal activity among certain offenders by diverting them from
traditional processing into community supervision and services"; "save prosecutive and
judicial resources for concentration on major cases"; and "provide, where appropriate, a
vehicle for restitution to communities and victims of crime").
125. Within this general framework there is great diversity in the specifics of these
agreements. For fuller descriptions, see Finder & McConnell, supra note 107, at 17-24;
Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution,93 VA. L. REV. 853, 893-901 (2007);
Orland, supranote 120, at 71-75; Paulsen, supra note 60, at 1439-43.
126. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 125, at 913-19 (discussing criticism for disparities in
terms, abusive insistence on "privilege waivers," unfairness to third parties such as
employees, the imposition of obligations unrelated to the organization's conduct, and
"potential abuses [in] implementation"); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and
the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 324-26 (2007) (criticizing
deferred prosecution agreements for imposing excessive and inappropriate managerial
control on the involved corporations); Orland, supra note 120, at 78-81 (discussing
arguments relating to abusive government tactics). But see James B. Jacobs & Ronald
Goldstock, Monitors & IPSIGS: Emergence of a New Criminal Justice Role, 43 CRIM. L.
Bull. 217, 230-35 (2007) (favorably evaluating the use of private sector monitors and
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criticism, there have been relatively few of these agreements overall.
Although commentators' counts vary, it appears that there were (at
most) sixty such agreements in the fifteen-year period from 1992
through 2006, the bulk of which, approximately forty, were entered
into between 2001 and 2006.127
Despite their relative infrequency, these agreements have further
shifted the role of corporations in the criminal process from criminal
target to prosecutorial agent. Nearly half of the agreements in the
fifteen-year period were described as "non-prosecution" agreements,
Independent Private Sector Inspectors General ("IPSIGs") to supervise corporate reform
of organizations targeted for criminal prosecution).
127. For totals, see Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non
ProsecutionAgreements, CORP. CRIME REP. (Dec. 28, 2005), http://www.corporatecrime
reporter.com/reportl22805.htm (totaling thirty-four cases); Finder & McConnell, supra
note 107, at 36-52 app. (totaling forty-eight cases); Orland, supra note 120, at 71-72, 86-87
tbls.I & II (totaling forty-four cases to June 2006); Paulsen, supra note 60, at 1444 (totaling
fifty-nine cases). Orland includes some cases that Finder & McConnell do not include and
vice-versa; Paulsen includes some additional cases plus settlements that have been publicly
reported but where there is no available public agreement. See Paulsen, supra note 60, at
1444 n.46. For a more updated list of agreements, see Brandon Garrett, Federal
OrganizationalProsecution Agreements, VA. L. LIBR., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/
prosecution-agreements/home.suphp (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (listing the companies that
have reached prosecution agreements with the government, including copies of those
agreements).
Note that these counts include only agreements entered into with the Justice
Department and do not include state agreements or similar agreements entered into with
other government agencies, such as the "corporate integrity agreements" entered into with
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (even though these agreements may
be accompanied by corporate criminal prosecutions). See Lewis Morris & Gary W.
Thompson, Reflections on the Government's Stick and CarrotApproach to FightingHealth
Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 341-43 (1999) (discussing use of corporate integrity
agreements, which stress compliance programs and mandatory outside auditing);
Corporate Integrity Agreements, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (describing typical provisions of
corporate integrity agreements with link to a list of providers currently subject to such
agreements). For examples of simultaneous filings of a criminal guilty plea and a corporate
integrity agreement, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company
Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa
(Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2009/ January/09-civ-038.html (announcing
guilty plea and $515 million fine, the "[1]argest [i]ndividual [c]orporate [ciriminal [fline in
[hlistory," plus up to $800 million in settlement of civil suits with federal and state
governments and summarizing corporate integrity agreement); Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Tap Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others Charged with Health Care
Crimes (Oct. 3, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ pr/2001/October/513civ.htm (announcing
guilty plea and $290 million criminal fine, the largest criminal fine ever in a health care
fraud prosecution). In the Eli Lilly case, the corporate integrity agreement was accepted in
lieu of probation and included a non-prosecution agreement with regard to other conduct
relating to Zyprexa. See Gov't Memorandum For Entry of Plea and Sentencing at 6-7,
United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 09-020 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/pae/News/ Pr/2009/jan/lillygovtmementrypleasent.pdf.
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meaning that no criminal charging document was even filed against
the corporation that entered into the agreement. 2 8 In the Enron era,
there were fewer than twenty-five deferred prosecution agreements
(in which a charging document was filed in court). 29 Of all the Enron
era agreements, fewer than twenty required the payment of a fine or
monetary penalty, although more agreements have required some
form of civil penalty and/or restitution payment. 30 So far, there are
no reports of any corporation having been found in breach of its
agreement, which means that all of the corporations that have
entered into these agreements have escaped the criminal process,
albeit at some financial and organizational cost.
The experience of these corporations stands in some contrast to
the individuals involved in these cases. According to the Justice
Department's Corporate Fraud Task Force, in the five years from
2002-2007, it obtained 1,236 convictions of individuals, of whom 214
were chief executive officers and presidents, 53 were chief financial
officers, 129 were vice presidents, and 23 were corporate counsel or
attorneys. 3' In comparison, by the end of the Enron era, only one
organization had been subject to criminal trial, Arthur Andersen
LLP, Enron's outside auditor, and that was on a charge of obstructing
justice during the government investigation of Enron rather than for
any accounting fraud.
Enron, a corporation in bankruptcy,
cooperated with prosecutors without entering into any formal
agreement. It was never criminally charged.

128. See Orland, supra note 120, at 57 (listing twenty of forty-four agreements as nonprosecutions). Commentators point out, however, that the Department has not been
consistent in its characterization of the agreements, occasionally referring to agreements in
which no charging documents are filed as being deferred prosecution agreements. See id.
at 56 n.62 (discussing the difference in characterization of the Prudential agreement);
Letter Agreement from Edwin J. Gale, Acting U.S. Att'y, Dist. of Conn., Peter A. Clark,
Assistant U.S. Att'y, Dist. of Conn., & Thomas J. Murphy, Assistant U.S. Att'y, Dist. of
Conn. to Eliot Lauer, Esq. & Shaun S. Sullivan, Esq., (Apr. 15, 1996),
http://www.corporate crimereporter.com/documents/andersen.pdf; infra notes 310-21 and
accompanying text.
129. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 107, at 36-52 app. (listing twenty-three
cases); Orland, supra note 120, at 57 (listing twenty-one cases).
130. Orland lists fourteen cases. See Orland,supra note 120, at 86-87 tbls.1 & 2. Finder
& McConnell include four later-filed agreements, of which two require a monetary
penalty. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 107, at 36-52 app.
131. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: President's Corporate Fraud
Task Force Marks Five Years of Ensuring Corporate Integrity (July 17, 2007),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2007/July/07_odag-507.html.
132. Cf id. (making no mention of any corporate defendants, not even Arthur
Andersen LLP, even though the Justice Department's press release, covering five years of
corporate fraud prosecutions, discusses "prosecuting corporate criminals").
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C. Banking the Fires:2006-2009
As the wave of corporate accounting scandals receded, some
reassessment of the steps taken during the Enron era began to
emerge, along with some resistance to those steps. This reassessment
and resistance manifested itself in three important developments. The
first was the district court's two decisions in United States v. Stein, one
finding unconstitutional certain aspects of the Thompson
Memorandum along with the conduct of the U.S. Attorney's Office in
negotiating a deferred prosecution agreement with the accounting
firm of KPMG ("Stein I"),133 and the other suppressing certain
statements that KPMG employees made to the government after
KPMG threatened to withhold advancement of their attorneys' fees
and to fire them if they failed to cooperate ("Stein II").1'3 The second
important development was the revision of the Thompson
Memorandum to moderate the Justice Department's position
regarding waiver of attorney-client and work-product protections.
The third was proposed revisions for regulating securities markets
and professionals, including modifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and a proposal to change the standard that federal prosecutors use for
determining when to prosecute entities criminally.
The Stein decisions, handed down in June and July of 2006, grew
out of the federal government's investigation of aggressive tax shelter
strategies that KPMG had promoted from the late 1990s through
2002.135 After congressional hearings in 2003 and a Senate
subcommittee report criticizing the tax shelter industry and KPMG, a
federal grand jury was convened to investigate KPMG's conduct.13 6 In
May 2005, KPMG was informed that it faced criminal charges.137 In
June 2005, KPMG representatives met with Justice Department
officials and admitted that KPMG had sold shelters illegally, after
which KPMG made a public admission that former KPMG partners
133. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008)
(dismissing indictments of thirteen of sixteen defendants).
134. 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
135. See Lynnley Browning & Jonathan D. Glater, How an Accounting Firm Went
from Resistance to Resignation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at 1; Letter From David N.
Kelley, U.S. Att'y, S. Dist. of N.Y., to Robert S. Bennett, Esq. (Aug. 26, 2005) [hereinafter
KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (accepting responsibility for conduct from 1996
through 2002).
136. See Browning & Glater, supra note 135. See generally U.S. Tax Shelter Industry:
The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003).
137. See David Reilly, How a Chastened KPMG Got by Tax-Shelter Crisis, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 15, 2007, at A16.
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had engaged in unlawful conduct.'3 8 In August, the government
unsealed fraud indictments against nine individuals and announced a
deferred prosecution agreement with KPMG. 139
At the press conference announcing the agreement, Attorney
General Gonzales emphasized that KPMG had "admitted to criminal
wrongdoing" in the largest tax-shelter fraud ever prosecuted and
would pay $456 million in "fines, restitution, and penalties."' 40
Gonzales also explained that the decision to defer prosecution, rather
than to require that KPMG go to trial on the criminal information
that was part of the agreement, "reflects the reality that the
conviction of an organization can affect innocent workers and others
associated with the organization, and can even have an impact on the
national economy."14 ' Although Gonzales described the collateral
consequences rather broadly, the Department was particularly
concerned that a criminal conviction of KPMG could have put the
firm out of business, the fate that other financial services firms had
suffered, particularly Arthur Andersen.'4 2
The deferred prosecution agreement acknowledged that
KPMG's cooperation with the criminal investigation had been an
"important and material factor" in the Justice Department's
willingness to enter into the agreement. 4 3 One aspect of that
cooperation, although not mentioned directly in the deferred
prosecution agreement, was KPMG's decision to condition
advancement of its partners' and employees' legal fees on their
willingness to assist the government's investigation." KPMG took
this action as part of an effort to demonstrate a cooperative attitude,
consistently with the Thompson Memorandum.145 Indeed,

138. See id.
139. See Jonathan Weil, Nine are Charged in KPMG Case on Tax Shelters, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 30, 2005, at C1.
140. See Press Conference, Prepared Remarks, Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2005/
082905agkpgmcorpfraud.htm [hereinafter Press Conference]. Of the $456 million, only
$128 million was denominated as a fine, an amount that reflected a disgorgement of the
fees that KPMG had received for its illegal activities. See KPMG Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 135, at 2.
141. Press Conference, supra note 140, at 1-2.
142. See Weil, supranote 139.
143. See KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 135, at 9.
144. See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(quoting law firm memorandum).
145. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 112, § VI.B (advancing attorneys' fees
"may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a corporation's
cooperation").
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government prosecutors had placed great stress on the issue in the
course of their discussions with KPMG. 14 6 The second aspect of
KPMG's cooperation was its willingness to make its employees
available for interviewing by the government. This type of
cooperation was not only specifically mentioned in the Thompson
Memorandum as relevant to the decision on whether to charge the
corporation; 147 it was subsequently required in the deferred
prosecution agreement as part of KPMG's continuing duty to
cooperate with the government. 148
In the Stein litigation, the defendants filed two sets of motions:
one to exclude statements they made to government attorneys, as
being coerced by KPMG's threats to cut off their legal fees and fire
them, in violation of their Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination; the other to dismiss their indictments because the
government's conduct relating to advancement of legal fees violated
their Fifth Amendment due process right and Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. The district court held that some of the defendants'
statements were, in fact, coerced and that the coercive pressure on
these defendants "was a product of intentional government action." 149
Accordingly, the district court suppressed the use of these
statements.5 o Although the motions to dismiss the indictments were
not initially granted (instead, the court sought a way to require
KPMG to advance the fees"'), the district court did find that the
Thompson Memorandum, coupled with the conduct of the U.S.
Attorney's Office, deprived defendants of their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.152 In so holding, the court emphasized the
enormous complexity of the case-"the largest tax case in United
States history," at that point being litigated jointly against eighteen

146. See Stein , 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341-49 (describing focus on KPMG's payments of
partners' counsel fees).
147. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 112, § 6A.
148. See KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 135, at 11 ("Using its
reasonable best efforts to make available its present and former partners and employees
to provide information and/or testimony as requested by the [U.S. Attorney's] Office and
the IRS, including sworn testimony before a grand jury or in court proceedings, as well as
interviews with law enforcement authorities .... ).
149. See United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
150. Id. at 338.
151. See Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 377-80 (exercising ancillary jurisdiction to allow civil
suit against KPMG for state law claim for advancement of counsel fees).
152. See id. at 382.
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defendants-and pointed out that a "minimal defense" for a
defendant would likely be $500,000 to $1 million. 53 The court wrote:
Justice is not done when the government uses the threat of
indictment-a matter of life and death to many companies and
therefore a matter that threatens the jobs and security of
blameless employees-to coerce companies into depriving
their ... employees of the means of defending themselves
against criminal charges in a court of law .... [T]he
determination of guilt or innocence must be made fairly-not in
a proceeding in which the government has obtained an unfair
advantage long before the trial even has begun.154
The district court's highly critical opinions in Stein came in the
midst of substantial criticism of the Thompson Memorandum on
another ground: its discussion of a corporation's willingness to waive
the attorney-client and work-product protections. As with the nonadvancement of counsel fees and making employees available for
questioning, the Thompson Memorandum considered such waiver an
indicium of cooperation with the government's investigation."'
Indeed, many lawyers believed that government prosecutors in the
Enron era had come routinely to demand such waivers, leading to a
"culture of waiver" among prosecutors.'56 As with non-advancement
of employee legal fees, privilege waiver involved a concern about the
adequacy of legal representation, but, here, for corporations rather
than individuals.
In December of 2006, with legislation on these issues pending in
Congress,"' the deputy attorney general of the Justice Department,

153. See id. at 362 n.163. For the district court's further elaboration on the case's
complexity, see United States v. Stein, No. S1-05CR-0888, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1825, at
*11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2007) (responding to court of appeals' invitation to comment on
issues raised by defendants' mandamus petition).
154. Stein 1,435 F. Supp. 2d at 381-82.
155. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 112, § VIA.
156. See, e.g., ASS'N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT 3-4 (2006) (discussing survey results
relating to whether there is a "government culture of waiver": "Almost 75% of both inside
and outside counsel who responded to this question expressed agreement [almost 40%
agreeing strongly] with a statement that a 'culture of waiver' has evolved in which
governmental agencies believe it is reasonable and appropriate for them to expect a
company under investigation to broadly waive attorney-client privilege or work-product
protections").
157. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006)
(applying to attorney-client privilege and work-product protection waivers, and to
advancement of counsel fees). The bill did not pass, but Senator Specter, responsible for
introducing the bill, continued to introduce similar legislation. See Attorney-Client
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Paul McNulty, announced a revision of the Thompson Memorandum,
replacing it with the "McNulty Memorandum."'s The primary
changes in the Memorandum were in the provisions dealing with
waivers and advancement of attorneys' fees. For the former, the new
guidelines established a more formal procedure for assessing the need
for waivers and described the types of privileged information that can
be sought;' 9 for the latter, the new guidelines elaborated on the brief
discussion of advancement of fees in the Thompson Memorandum,
now stating that "[p]rosecutors generally should not take into account
whether a corporation is advancing attorneys' fees to employees or
agents under investigation and indictment."16 0
The day after McNulty announced the changes in the Thompson
Memorandum, the SEC announced several changes in guidance it
provides for compliance with the requirements of section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,'61 the most criticized section of the Act.162
Section 404 gives the Commission authority to prescribe rules for
management reporting of its internal control structure and
procedures for financial reporting.16 The new guidance the
Commission proposed was intended to ease the burdens of that
reporting, particularly for smaller public companies." Like the
McNulty Memorandum, the SEC's actions reflected an effort to
respond to calls for congressional cut-back of government

Privilege Protection Act of 2009, S. 445, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); see also 154 CONG. REC.
2331-32 (2009) (remarks of Senator Arlen Specter).
158. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Att'ys, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/
2006/mcnulty memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum].
159. See id. § VII.B.2.
160. Id. § VII.B.3.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006).
162. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITITEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION
115 (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReport
REV2.pdf ("The main policy debate over SOX, however, is focused on the
); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C Eases
implementation of a single provision, Section 404.
Regulation on Business, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at C1.
163. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a).
164. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to Propose Interpretive
Guidance for Management to Improve Sarbanes-Oxley 404 Implementation (Dec. 13,
2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-101.htm ("While the guidance is intended
to help public companies of all sizes, smaller companies ... should benefit from its
scalability and flexibility."). For the full text of the proposed guidance release, see
MANAGEMENT'S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING AND
CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE ACT PERIODIC REPORTS OF
COMPANIES THAT ARE NOT ACCELERATED FILERS 17 (2006), available at

http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8618.pdf.
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enforcement. Like the McNulty Memorandum, the SEC still did not
go as far as it could have."
The post-Enron era reassessment is perhaps best encapsulated in
a report by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation
("Committee"), a private group made up of experts from finance,
business, academia, and law. Issued on November 30, 2006, shortly
before the McNulty Memorandum and the SEC's Rule 404 guidance,
the Committee's report suggested a wide range of regulatory and
enforcement changes "to prevent a further erosion of the competitive
position of U.S. capital markets."'" Among its recommendations was
a change in Justice Department prosecutorial policy "to prohibit
federal prosecutors from seeking waivers of the attorney-client
privilege or the denial of attorneys' fees to employees, officers, or

directors." 167
The Committee's report also considered the wisdom of corporate
criminal liability. The Committee asserted that, "[e]xcept in truly
exceptional cases, there is no independent benefit to be gained from
indicting what is in fact an artificial entity" and emphasized the cost
of a corporate criminal prosecution to "innocent employees and
shareholders" and, sometimes, "the entire economy"-an echo of the
concerns expressed by Attorney General Gonzales in announcing the
deferred prosecution agreement with KPMG.M The Committee
accordingly recommended a change in the Justice Department's
prosecutorial policies so that "firms are only prosecuted in
exceptional circumstances of pervasive culpability throughout all
offices and ranks." 69
There is no indication that the Committee's recommendation to
limit corporate criminal liability, a sweeping recommendation not
restricted to securities or accounting fraud prosecutions, is about to
be adopted as a formal matter. Nevertheless, the recommendation
may very well have reflected Justice Department policy at that time,
at least regarding fraud prosecutions, where actual corporate
prosecutions have been quite rare.
The McNulty Memorandum, however, did not turn out to mark
the Justice Department's final retreat from its Enron era
165. See Labaton,supra note 162.
166. INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION,
supra note 162, at xii.
167. Id. at 86. The Committee recommended no changes in section 404 of SarbanesOxley, but did recommend changes in SEC guidance. See id. at 131-34.
168. See id. at 85.
169. Id. at 84.
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prosecutorial stance. Critics of the new guidelines, including the
American Bar Association, believed that the changes fell "far short of
what [wa]s needed to prevent further erosion" of the privilege
because they still left open the possibility that the Department would
insist on waiver as an indicium of cooperation and because the
guidelines failed to protect employees from corporate discipline
during an investigation. 170 On August 28, 2008, the Justice
Department finally responded to this continuing criticism with new
Corporate Charging Guidelines, now incorporated in the United
States Attorneys' Manual.1 7' The new guidelines went considerably
further toward removing privilege waiver as an important aspect in
deciding whether to prosecute and made more categorical the
prohibition on taking account of whether a corporation was
advancing or reimbursing attorneys' fees to its employees. 172 Perhaps
more importantly, the Corporate Charging Guidelines try to position
non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements as related to
the problem of the "significant" collateral consequences that criminal
prosecution can cause.173 Such agreements are now formally viewed as
a "third option" between indictment and declination that can
promote compliance and prevent recidivism. 7411It is, of course, true
that these agreements can advance these two goals, but the
agreements are also a way to secure assistance with the prosecution.
Moreover, they do not necessarily eliminate the potential for
collateral effects, particularly for deferred prosecution agreements,
170. See Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, Statement Regarding Revisions to
the Justice Department's Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.abanet
.org/abanet/medialstatement/statement.cfm?releaseid=59.
171. See U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/usaol
[hereinafter Corporate Charging
eousa/foiareading-room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm
Guidelines]. For explanation of the Department's goals in issuing these guidelines, see
Press Release, Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att'y Gen., Remarks Prepared for Delivery at Press
Conference Announcing Revisions to Corporate Charging Guidelines (Aug. 28, 2008),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2008/dag-speech-0808286.html
[hereinafter
Filip Press Release].
172. Compare Corporate Charging Guidelines, supra note 171, § 9-28.730 ("In
evaluating cooperation, however, prosecutors should not take into account whether
corporation is advancing or reimbursing attorneys' fees .... "), with McNulty
Memorandum, supra note 158, § VII.B.3 ("Prosecutors generally should not take into
account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys' fees to employees .... ").
Curiously, although Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip indicated that the McNulty
Memorandum had "allowed prosecutors to consider whether a corporation disciplined or
terminated employees for the purpose of evaluating cooperation," and that this was "now
disallowed," there does not appear to be any change in the language of the Corporate
Charging Guidelines to reflect this change. See Filip Press Release, supra note 171.
173. See Corporate Charging Guidelines, supra note 171, § 9-28.1000.
174. See id.
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which include some charging document that can be pursued in the
event that the corporation breaches its agreement.
Coincidentally, on the same day that the Justice Department
issued its new guidelines, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided the government's appeal in Stein, in which it
affirmed the district court's decision that the Justice Department's
conduct in pressuring KPMG to deny advancement of counsel fees to
non-cooperating employees had violated the defendants' Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.175 The court rejected the government's
argument that KPMG's action was private action, not state action,
and held that the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to counsel
were violated when some of them could not retain counsel of their
choosing and others had to restrict the efforts of the lawyers they
retained.176 The court was quite clear in its condemnation of the
Department: "[I]f it is in the government's interest that every
defendant receive the best possible representation, it cannot also be
in the government's interest to leave defendants naked to their
enemies. "177
Just at the moment that the Justice Department, rebuked by the
Second Circuit and with Congress still threatening legislative
restrictions, was retreating from the prosecutorial zeal of the Enron
era, events were set in motion that signaled the end of "banking the
fires" and the likely beginning of the next era in financial fraud
prosecutions. These events began with the subprime mortgage crisis
in 2007, which led to a broad melt-down of financial institutions
worldwide. With this melt-down came renewed attention to criminal
prosecution. This time, however, the attorney general did not
organize a prosecutorial task force similar to the Corporate Fraud
Task of 2002, likely reflecting White House and Treasury Department
criticism that earlier prosecutions demonstrated an "antibusiness
attitude that could chill corporate risk taking." 7
Nevertheless, the attorney general's decision did not mean that
the Justice Department turned a blind eye to current problems.
175. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008). The court did not
reach the district court's decision that the government had also violated the defendants'
Fifth Amendment due process rights. See id. at 136.
176. See id. at 147-48, 157.
177. Id. at 157.
178. See Eric Lichtblau et al., F.B.I. Struggling to Handle Wave of Finance Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at 1 (reporting Attorney General Mukasey's rejection of "repeated
calls" for forming such a task force and reporting that former law enforcement officials
had said in interviews that "senior administration officials" in the White House and
Treasury had conveyed their concerns to them about the cases they were bringing).
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Instead, the prosecutorial effort was pushed out to other parts of the
Justice Department, particularly U.S. attorneys offices in Manhattan,
Brooklyn, and New Jersey, which, along with the New York state
attorney general, began a relatively coordinated effort to investigate
the collapses of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.17 9 Whether those investigations would ripen
into actual prosecutions (and of what sort), however, was left to the
next administration at the Department of Justice."o
D.

Conclusion

The development of the branch-office role has shown a continual
honing of the prosecutors' tools in business crime cases. When
prosecutors have been criticized for the way in which they have used
these tools, particularly with regard to deferred and non-prosecution
agreements, they have chosen to modify their practices, but not to
abandon them. Political changes in the administration of the Justice
Department can affect prosecutorial policies, of course, but the early
returns from the Obama administration indicate a continuing
exploitation of the branch-office role"' and a continuing acceptance
of the fundamental policy view expressed in the Bush
administration's Corporate Charging Guidelines, guidelines which
remain in effect:

179. See Benjamin Weiser & Ben White, In Crisis, ProsecutorsPut Aside Turf Wars,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at B1 (reporting agreement between U.S. attorney for the
Southern District and New York Attorney General Cuomo to engage in joint investigation
and stating that the Lehman investigation was split up "because there were too many
avenues of inquiry for any one office to handle").
180. See Amir Efrati & Susan Pulliam, Prosecutorsare Poised to Impanel AIG Grand
Jury,WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2009, at C1 (describing efforts in major cases).
181. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1-3, United States v. Barclays Bank,
No. 10-CR-00218 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/
Garrett/prosecution-agreements/pdflbarclays.pdf (agreement to split a "Forfeiture
Amount" of $298 million 50-50 with the Manhattan D.A.'s Office) (violations of the
Trading With The Enemy Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act);
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6-7, United States v. Daimler AG, No. 10-CR-00063
(D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminallfraud/fcpalcases/docs/
daimlerag-def-agree.pdf (agreement to pay $93.6 million fine; fine amount reduced
because of Daimler's cooperation, "including sharing information with the Department
regarding evidence obtained as a result of Daimler's extensive investigation of corrupt
payments made by Daimler in various countries around the world); Deferred Prosecution
Agreement at 3, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-CR-60033 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2009),
available
at
http://wsj.com/public/resources/documents/UBSDeferredProsecution
Agreement20090219.pdf (agreement to pay $380,000 in disgorgement of profits and
$400,000 in federal backup withholding tax and interest and penalties; prosecution
foregoes additional penalties because of the financial crisis).
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The prosecution of corporate crime is a high priority for
the Department

of Justice ....

In this regard, federal

prosecutors and corporate leaders typically share common
goals. For example, directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty
to a corporation's shareholders, the corporation's true owners,
and they owe duties of honest dealing to the investing public in
connection with the corporation's regulatory filings and public
statements. The faithful execution of these duties by corporate
leadership serves the same values in promoting public trust and
confidence that our criminal cases are designed to serve.'82
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY

The continuing evolution of the public corporation's role in the
criminal justice process, more as partner than as defendant, raises
four important questions for criminal justice policy: (1) Will this
institutional shift be short-lived or long-lasting? (2) What legal rules
might be affected by the branch-office role? (3) Will the new branchoffice role affect the willingness of prosecutors to bring criminal cases
against corporations? (4) How might this new role affect deterrence
in business crime cases?
This Part proceeds as follows. Part II.A argues that the
institutional shift to the branch-office role will be long-lasting because
the amnesty, non-prosecution, and deferred prosecution agreements
(collectively referred to as "agency agreements") have important
efficiency properties, effectively exploiting the misalignment of
interests between the corporation and its employees. Part II.B deals
with three important legal issues: judicial review of agency
agreements, the application of the attorney-client privilege to
corporate investigations, and the imposition of constitutional
constraints on corporations involved in internal investigations. This
subpart argues that judicial review should be confined to issues of
breach and not examine the agreement's terms; that courts have
already come close to aligning the attorney-client privilege with the
branch-office role; and that any further effort to impose constitutional
restrictions on corporate conduct could have a deleterious impact on
business crime prosecutions. Part II.C discusses why the new branchoffice role might lessen prosecutorial willingness to invoke the
criminal law against corporations, arguing that it would be wrong to
reason from current experience that it is safe to cut back on such
prosecutions. Part II.D argues that over-reliance on the branch-office
182. Corporate Charging Guidelines, supra note 171, § 9-28.100.
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role, coupled with a reluctance to bring criminal charges against
corporations, has the potential to undercut the deterrent function of
the criminal law in business crime cases. This is the most serious
adverse potential effect that the new branch-office role holds for
criminal justice policy.
A.

The Economics of the Branch-Office Role

The evolution of the public corporation's role may not have been
inevitable, but its new role now reflects certain institutional realities
that are unlikely to change in the near future. These realities relate to
the efficiency properties of agency agreements and the incentives they
reflect.
The history of entity criminal liability, from Senator Sherman's
remarks in debate on the antitrust laws183 to KPMG's recent
actions,'84 demonstrate the potential misalignment of the interests of
organizations and their members. Business organizations (or, more
precisely, those who control them) may be perfectly willing to
sacrifice the interests of particular employees if this sacrifice will
avoid damage to the profitability of the enterprise.
A key insight of economics is that actors, whether individuals or
organizations, will respond to incentives. To the extent that there are
incentives to cooperate with government investigators in business
crime cases, those making decisions for the organization will
cooperate, even if it means that some constituents (employees or,
perhaps, current shareholders) suffer.
The modern development of tools for rewarding corporate
cooperation has increased the incentives for cooperation. Prosecutors
have often made these incentives explicit, particularly when it comes
to privilege waivers and non-support of investigational targets, but in
the future, prosecutors can be less explicit and still gain corporate
cooperation. Once corporate decision-makers are aware of the
incentives calculus, cooperation will be forthcoming and explicit
demands will actually be less necessary. Lawyers know this. As one
practitioner put it, after noting the " 'tremendous pressure' " that
corporations feel to share the results of investigations with law
enforcement personnel: " 'There may be a day when defense lawyers
do defense work again,' . . . but 'we live in a world where the

183. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
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expectation is, if you are conducting that investigation, you are doing
it to help the Department of Justice.' "185
Developments outside of prosecutors' control have also
increased the conflicting incentives faced by the organization, its
employees, and its management. As corporate boards, corporate
employees, outside directors, and independent auditors face an
increasing chance of incurring civil or criminal liability for
participation in potentially unlawful corporate conduct, the ability of
the corporation to maintain an adversarial stance with the
government has decreased while the incentives to cooperate have
increased.1 6
An example of the dynamic caused by conflicting interests and
incentives to cooperate can be seen in the case of Stolt-Nielsen, a
European conglomerate, allegedly involved in fixing the prices of
ocean shipments of liquid chemicals.187 In January 2002, a Stolt
executive apparently announced to the Stolt transportation group's
management board that Stolt and a competitor had agreed to divide
certain markets."' Shortly thereafter, the general counsel of the
transportation group asked the chairman of the group to suspend the
executive and conduct an internal investigation. 89 The chairman
refused and the general counsel resigned.190 There is some dispute
about whether Stolt then terminated its participation in the

185. Compliance Pros Get Tips on Keeping Firms Out of Court, 91 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 2261, at 14, 16 (July 7, 2006) (quoting a lawyer from Covington &
Burling).
186. See Peter Lattman, Settlement in Just for Feet Case May Fan Board Fears:
Directors' Payment of $441.5 Million Shows the Risk of Liability, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23,
2007, at B6 (reporting agreement of outside directors of Just for Feet to pay $41.5 million
settlement in securities fraud litigation, a larger settlement than outside directors of
WorldCom or Enron had paid); Jonathan Weil, WorldCom's Ex-Directors Pony Up:
Agreement in Principle to Pay Out PersonalFunds Creates Liability Precedent,WALL ST.
J., Jan. 6, 2005, at A3 (agreement by ten WorldCom outside directors to pay $18 million
above amount covered by directors' liability insurance). But cf Bernard Black, Brian
Cheffins, & Michael Klausner, Outside DirectorLiability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1063-64
(2006) (finding only thirteen cases between 1980 through 2005 in which directors made
out-of-pocket payments in private securities actions and assessing the risk of such liability
as very low).
187. See James Bandler, Ship Mates: How Seagoing Chemical Haulers May Have Tried
to Divide Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20,2003, at Al.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
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conspiracy, but there is no dispute that Stolt did not inform the
Justice Department at the time about the illegal behavior.'
In June 2002, however, the former general counsel filed suit in
Connecticut state court against Stolt for money damages, claiming
that he was forced to leave Stolt because he could not "ethically and
legally" remain in Stolt's management when it was engaged in illegal
behavior. 19 2 Stolt resisted the suit, but five months later the Wall Street
Journal published an article relating the details of Stolt's former
general counsel's suit.'93 With the publication of the article, Stolt's
calculus of what was in its corporate interests changed. Its rational
choice now was to join with the government, not fight it. Stolt hired
outside antitrust counsel and briefed him on the day the Wall Street
Journal article appeared. 9 4 He immediately contacted the Justice
Department and applied for amnesty for Stolt, thereby committing
the company to its branch-office role of assisting the government in
investigating the illegal conduct.'
Making corporations into agents of the prosecutor also offers
substantial efficiency
benefits to prosecutors. Obviously,
prosecutorial resources are scarce, so enlisting corporations and their
lawyers extends those resources with no direct financial cost to
taxpayers, enabling investigations to be done more cheaply and more
quickly. This was the lesson that the SEC learned early on in its
investigation of corporate questionable payments.
The efficiencies go beyond the simple question of finite
resources, however. Prosecutors' offices face an issue of institutional
competence that is familiar to the business world. Just as corporations
often face the question of "build or buy," that is, the question of
whether it is more efficient to bring into the firm the necessary
resources for accomplishing a particular task or to buy the resources
through an external contract, so, too, do prosecutors' offices.
191. See Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss the Indictment at 5-12, United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 586
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 06-CR-466) [hereinafter Memorandum in Opposition], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f220800/ 220771.pdf. (setting out Justice Department's view
of Stolt's conduct after its general counsel's resignation).
192. See O'Brien v. Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Grp. Ltd., 838 A.2d 1086,1079 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2003) (describing litigation).
193. See James Bandler & John McKinnon, Stolt-Nielsen Unit is Probedfor Traffic with
Iran, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2002, at A3. Although the Journal reported the date of the
complaint as November 1, this was apparently the date of the amended complaint; the
original complaint was filed on June 18,2002. See Memorandum in Opposition, supra note
191, at 8.
194. See Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 191, at 11.
195. See id. at 12-13.
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Although prosecutors might be able to acquire internal expertise
about particular industries or practices, the challenge of
understanding complex industries and their practices is particularly
acute in business crime cases where much of the information about
the crime is embedded in the business entity itself.19 6 For these cases
to be prosecuted successfully, prosecutors need to "contract out" by
forming some type of public-private partnering with the business
entities themselves. This is why prosecutors have been willing to
make use of the private sector in many areas of business crime
enforcement, not just in accounting fraud cases. 197
Although it might be efficient for prosecutors to partner with
private firms in investigating business crime, such partnerships
involve the familiar problem of agency cost.198 Particularly where an
agent is outside the firm, the risk that an agent will act in its own
interest requires the principal to undertake potentially costly
monitoring of the agent's behavior to ensure consistency with the
principal's desires. Today's amnesty, non-prosecution, and deferred
prosecution agreements can be seen as a way to deal with this agency
problem. These agreements are tools to ensure that the agent's
conduct is aligned with the principal's interests by memorializing the
various obligations of the corporation-agent and the prosecutorprincipal and providing enforcement mechanisms for the agent's
breach. These contractual obligations are then strengthened through
social norms of cooperation (hence the introduction to the McNulty
196. See Yane Svetiev, Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 593, 632-33 (2007) (discussing benefits to the firm of accessing external sources
of knowledge).
197. See, e.g., Statement from John Brownlee, U.S. Att'y, W.D. Va., On the Guilty Plea
of ITI' Corporation 7 (Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/nsd/pdflitt-statement-by
_usattorney.pdf (noting that the government was able to develop only a "limited criminal
case" against ITT until a change in corporate management led ITT to cooperate with the
government and produce evidence that led to guilty pleas and a deferred prosecution
agreement requiring extensive monitoring and reporting to government agencies). For the
information and plea agreement, see United States v. ITT Corp. (W.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/pdflit-information-plea-agreement.pdf. For an
earlier example of the private industry training government investigators and assisting in
identifying criminal conduct, see Harry First, Protecting Soft Property Through the
Criminal Law: The Emerging View from the United States, 2 NIHON U. COMP. L. 1, 2-3
(1985) (describing IBM's assistance to the FBI in "Operation Pengem" to prevent the
illegal sale of technological information).
198. "Agency costs" are the costs incurred in dealing with the divergence of interest
between a principal and its agent. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 308 (1976). These costs include the principal's monitoring expenditures, the agent's
bonding expenditures, and any "residual" loss arising from the remaining divergence
between the agent's decisions and the principal's welfare. See id.
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Memorandum, reminding corporate leaders of their duties' 9 9) and
trust (hence the importance of the reputation of legal intermediaries
who carry out the internal investigations or make cooperation
proffers to prosecutors2 '00).
Adding to the usual problem of agency risk is the possibility that
these agreements may be prone to breakdowns or failures because
some of the agents making these agreements were lawbreakers in the
first place, who cooperate only because they were caught or were
about to be caught. This concern for ensuring against bad faith
behavior from lawbreakers may explain the much-criticized
provisions in the deferred prosecution agreements that give the
Department the unilateral right to revoke the agreement in the event
of a breach.20 ' Indeed, declared breaches appear to have been rare so
far, perhaps indicating that the unilateral revocation clause has
deterred corporations from reneging on their agreements.2 02
199. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
200. See Bandler & Scannell, supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing SEC's
efforts to track the thoroughness of law firms in doing internal investigations); Klawiter,
supra note 75, at 17 (describing the role of lawyers in seeking leniency on behalf of a client
and concluding that "[u]ltimately, it is a question of commitment, trust and good faith that
both parties have a solemn obligation to uphold").
201. See, e.g., KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 135, at 14 ("It is
further understood that should the Office in its sole discretion determine that KPMG has,
after the date of the execution of this Agreement: (a) given false, incomplete or misleading
information, (b) committed any crime other than a minor state violation, or (c) otherwise
violated any provision of this Agreement, KPMG shall, in this Office's sole discretion,
thereafter be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation of which the Office
has knowledge, including but not limited to a prosecution based on the Information or the
conduct described therein."). But see Greenblum, supra note 124, at 1892-93 (arguing for
judicial involvement in the event of a breach); Paulsen, supra note 60, at 164-65.
202. A rare example of a revocation is the Antitrust Division's decision to revoke
Stolt-Nielsen's amnesty agreement. The agreement was conditioned on continuing
cooperation with the Division, but the Division uncovered evidence that it believed
demonstrated that Stolt had not stopped its illegal price fixing conduct when its general
counsel brought the conduct to the attention of upper management, even though it had
told prosecutors otherwise. See Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 191, at 12-13.
Stolt vigorously resisted the revocation. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d
177, 186 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing district court decision enjoining the Division from
indicting Stolt and a Stolt executive; putative defendant's ability to challenge a
government decision to pursue a prosecution is "narrow[]"; proper place to raise the issue
is on a motion to dismiss an indictment, should one be returned). The Division
subsequently indicted Stolt and the executive, but the district court dismissed the
indictment. See United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 586, 609 (E.D. Pa.
2007) ("The Division has no reasonable basis upon which to void or revoke the
Agreement because it has not demonstrated any breach by Stolt-Nielsen or the individual
defendants."). The Division chose not to appeal. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice,
Justice Department Will Not Appeal Stolt-Nielson Decision (Dec. 21, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2007/228788.pdf.
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Effect of the Branch-Office Role on Legal Rules

Putting prosecutorial agreements into a principallagent
framework may help describe the problems that these agreements are
trying to address, but this contractual framework is not a perfect
institutional fit for analyzing these agreements or assessing the effect
of the branch-office role on the institutions of criminal law
enforcement. After all, law enforcement agencies have some specific
institutional goals that corporations do not have: prosecutors are
supposed to seek justice and to operate in the public interest; private
corporations have no such obligation.203 Prosecutors also have a
different constraint imposed on them than corporations have:
prosecutors are bound by constitutional limitations; private
corporations are not. The branch-office role, however, shifts private
corporations closer to the public agency. Does that mean that the
legal rules affecting this partnership should be altered to take greater
account of the public duties and constraints that we normally place
only on government agencies?
There are three areas in which this institutional shift might affect
legal rules. One is the scrutiny with which courts review prosecutorial
agency agreements. The other two involve the legal rules that courts
apply to private corporations engaged in investigations in their
branch-office roles, specifically, the attorney-client privilege and the
scope of constitutional protections.20
203. See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987) ("Between the private life of
the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor .... For this
reason, we must have assurance that those who would wield this power will be guided
solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice.") (holding that a
court cannot appoint an interested party to prosecute a contempt of the court's order);
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.") (granting new trial where prosecutor's misconduct during the trial
was "pronounced and persistent"); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1044 (2006) (discussing the need for constitutional
separation of powers analysis to check the prosecutorial administration of the criminal
law).
204. Obstruction of justice is another important area affected by the branch-office role.
Although federal obstruction statutes apply to government investigations, some courts
have been willing to apply these statutes to misstatements made to private counsel in the
course of an internal investigation or audit when the results would likely be shared with
governmental investigators. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, No. H-06-080, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47961, at *17-21 (S.D. Tex. July 14, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss
indictment charging obstruction of justice for impeding a governmental investigation by
providing false information to corporate employer's outside lawyers which the lawyers
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1. Judicial Review of Agency Agreements
It is arguable that when courts review prosecutorial agency
agreements they should recognize the public nature of these
agreements by providing greater supervision of their terms than they
provide for the terms of purely private agreements. This increased
scrutiny would not only acknowledge the prosecutor's public interest
obligation, but it would also take account of the fact that a prosecutor
wields the coercive power of the state, power which may lead the
prosecutor to over-reach in situations where defendants can resist
prosecutorial demands only at great peril.
Concern for the misuse of the state's coercive power was the
underlying message of the district court in Stein, when it pointed out
that KPMG faced enormous risks to its continued existence if it
decided to go to trial, leading KPMG to accede to prosecutors'
demands that it cut off attorneys fees to its partners and employees
despite its past history of advancing such fees.205 Indeed, much of the
criticism of the current use of agency agreements is bottomed on the
perception that corporate defendants are at such an enormous
bargaining disadvantage that prosecutors are able to obtain
excessively stringent terms that may have adverse public effects.206
Despite the arguments for greater judicial oversight of these
agreements, it is not clear that such oversight is either likely or

reported to government investigating agencies); United States v. Abrams, 543 F. Supp.
1184, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (denying motion to dismiss indictment charging obstruction of
justice arising out of internal corporate investigation where defendants allegedly lied to
outside lawyers and defendants could reasonably have believed that the information
would be communicated to government criminal investigators); see also Julie Rose
O'Sullivan, The Challenge of Cooperation: The DOJ Risks Killing the Golden Goose
Through Computer Associates/Singleton Theories of Obstruction, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1447, 1450 (2007) (discussing Singleton, supra, and an indictment against three executives
of Computer Associates for lying to outside counsel investigating corporate practices in
cooperation with a government investigation and criticizing Justice Department policy to
bring indictments in such situations). But cf. United States v. Kirkland, 985 F.2d 535, 53738 (11th Cir. 1993) (reversing sentencing guidelines enhancement for obstruction of
"official investigation" arising from defendant bank employee's lie to bank auditors with
regard to embezzled funds, where no law enforcement officer or governmental entity was
involved).
205. See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381-82 n.243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (pointing out that
an indictment can be "a matter of life and death to many companies" and referring
specifically to the experience of Arthur Andersen LLP).
206. See supra note 126. For a defense of one agreement that has been criticized as
overly-intrusive (the agreement with Bristol-Myers Squibb), see generally Christopher J.
Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good CorporateCitizenship: The
Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the Districtof New Jersey
and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043 (2006).
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warranted. As a general matter, courts have consistently been
reluctant to interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in a
wide variety of situations, at least absent legislative guidance or
intentionally unconstitutional behavior. Declinations of prosecution
are unreviewable in U.S. courts, for example, although actual (and
threatened) prosecutions can be subject to some constitutional
constraints.207 The decision to grant a witness immunity, 208 the terms
of plea bargains,209 even government settlements of cases210 are only
loosely controlled, even when there are federal statutes and court
rules that apply to these actions.
Courts can certainly be involved in deciding whether the
government or the defendant breached an agreement, 211 but it is
207. See Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 183 (citing cases where the threat of prosecution
could chill the exercise of constitutional rights); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 37374 (1886) ("Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.") (local ordinance making laundries operated in wooden
buildings illegal, unless approved by board of supervisors; enforced only against Chineseoperated laundries).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Skilling, No. H-04-025, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42664, at
*7 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 2006) (rejecting defense effort to attack government's use of
immunity grants, including government's unwillingness to immunize witnesses for the
defense: "The exclusive nature of Congress's delegation [under the statute establishing the
immunity process] and the fact that the balancing process is wholly within the expertise of
the executive branch foreclose federal courts from taking more than a ministerial role in
prosecutorial immunity decisions that are properly made under 18 U.S.C. § 6003").
209. Courts must review a plea agreement prior to entry to be certain that it is
voluntary and has a factual basis, but the court cannot participate in the negotiations or
modify the plea's terms. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F.
Supp. 287, 288 (D. Mass. 1994) (accepting corporate plea agreement, stating that "[w]hen,
as here, the joint sentencing recommendation is the result of arms' length negotiations
between capable counsel, this court believes the agreement should be accepted if it is
reasonable").
210. See, e.g., United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15-16 (D.D.C.
2007) (holding that a statute providing for court review of settlements of government
antitrust cases only requires district court to be certain that settlement is "within the
reaches of the public interest" and requires deference to the government's view); cf.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1105 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The
question assigned to the district courts by the Act [that permits court review of
government antitrust settlements] is a classic example of a question committed to the
Executive.... The question whether to prosecute a lawsuit is a question of the execution
of the laws, which is committed to the Executive by Art. II.").
211. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (vacating conviction based on
guilty plea, where prosecutor failed to keep its bargain regarding sentence
recommendation); Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 186 (stating in dictum that defendants may
assert government's breach of amnesty agreement as a defense to subsequent criminal
prosecution).
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doubtful whether this intervention should go beyond enforcing the
terms to which the parties have agreed. For one, the corporations that
have entered into these agreements have generally been powerful
public companies, well-counseled, and with a clear informational
advantage over the prosecution in terms of the offenses being
investigated. Part of these agreements include assistance in
prosecuting others, whether their own employees or co-conspirators.
It is hard to believe that these corporations would enter into such
agreements if they had no criminal exposure or that they would
accept agreements regardless of cost. "Baring one's breast" isn't free:
civil litigation for damages will inevitably follow, and it is not
organizationally costless to turn over culpable employees to the
government for prosecution.2 12 For another, the criminal process, for
whatever its vagaries, provides important procedural advantages to
corporate defendants in business crime cases, not the least of which is
the requirement that the prosecution prove what can be a very
complicated case beyond a reasonable doubt. Corporate defendants
have been successful in obtaining acquittals even in highly publicized
cases.213 It is also worth remembering that even relatively
212. These employees have included high-level management, as well as lower-level
employees. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(investigating and indicting KPMG partners and employees). Sacrificing such employees
may cause managerial crises and may trigger later litigation if the employee is
subsequently exonerated. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Evan Perez, HealthSouth May
Alter Board, WALL ST. J., June 22,2004, at A10 (detailing changes in management in wake
of accounting scandal); Dan Morse, Scrushy Wants His Job Back, WALL ST. J., July 1,
2005, at A3 (threatening a "long and very public battle" with new HealthSouth
management in wake of acquittal in criminal case); Dan Morse et al., HealthSouth's
Scrushy is Acquitted, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005, at Al (detailing Scrushy acquittal after
five former HealthSouth chief financial officers testified against him). HealthSouth's
management had cooperated with the government and had entered into a non-prosecution
agreement, which acknowledged the extent of HealthSouth's monetary settlements with
the SEC and defrauded investors, as well as HealthSouth's extensive management
changes. See Letter from Alice H. Martin, U.S. Att'y, to Robert S. Bennett, Esq. 1-4,
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/healthsouth.pdf.
213. See, e.g., State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1980), dealing with
prosecution of the Ford Motor Co. for reckless homicide arising out of the design of the
Pinto, acquittal reported, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1980, at 1. See generally FRANCIS T.
CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FORD PINTO CASE AND
BEYOND (1987) 145-89 (providing a historical overview of corporate criminal liability and

discussing the Ford Pinto case as an in-depth example). Reports of corporate acquittals,
however, are rare, perhaps because corporations prefer to plead rather than take the risk
of trial. See Sheri Qualters, Company Wins Rare Acquittal Against Price-Fixing Charges,
NAT'L L. J. (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=90000
5487306 (reporting acquittal of corporate defendant tried on price fixing charges and
defense counsel's statement that "[clorporations charged with criminal price fixing rarely
go to trial, much less win").
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uncomplicated cases can be difficult for the government to win once
they are placed within the corporate context. The Arthur Andersen
document destruction case demonstrates this point well. What was
supposed to be a "lay-down" case took the jurors ten days to decide,
with jurors at one point split on which of four Arthur Andersen
employees actually was the "corrupt persuader" for purposes of the
obstruction charge, and this despite the fact that the lead partner on
the Enron account had pleaded guilty and testified to his illegal
activities.2 14
It is thus more likely that corporations enter into deferred
prosecution agreements not because they are coerced to agree to
them despite excessively onerous terms, but because the terms are
more attractive than the present value of trial and punishment. 215 In
this setting, courts should be very cautious about rewriting the
agreement to give corporations a better deal than they originally
bargained for. Perhaps there will be cases where smaller, less wellresourced companies are overborne by prosecutors' demands, but
those cases have yet to be seen.
2. Attorney-Client Privilege
An important area in which the private corporation and a public
agency might be treated the same is the application and scope of the
attorney-client privilege. At first glance, of course, similar treatment
would seem unlikely because the privilege rules for private
corporations and the government are quite different. Under Upjohn,
private corporations can assert a corporate attorney-client privilege to
protect confidential communications. On the government side, courts
have consistently rejected the application of the attorney-client
privilege to communications between government attorneys and
government employees who reveal criminal misconduct,2 16 taking the
214. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 1 (reporting trial evidence of massive document destruction, as
well as evidence relating to the alteration of one key document); Kurt Eichenwald, One
Victory, and a Signal, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 1 (reporting the "far from muscular"
jury verdict in an "easy case"); Jonathan D. Glater, Jurors Say File Shredding Didn't
FactorInto Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 22 (reporting juror split over identity of
corrupt persuader and juror focus on alteration of one document, rather than document
shredding, and apparent disregard of testimony of David Duncan, the Andersen partner
who had pleaded guilty before trial).
215. Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 917, 924
(2008) (arguing that non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements are entered
into "at arms length during a bargaining process").
216. See, e.g., In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th
Cir. 2001) ("It would be both unseemly and a misuse of public assets to permit a public
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view that "the general duty of public service calls upon government
employees and agencies to favor disclosure over concealment."2 17
Nevertheless, in practice, the courts' treatment of the two privileges
may not be so dissimilar, for the private attorney-client privilege has
not proved as strong a barrier to disclosure of internal corporate
investigations as the Court might have envisioned in Upjohn.
For one, although Upjohn's holding is unquestioned, courts have
narrowly construed the privilege in the context of corporate
compliance efforts. For example, courts have refused to apply the
privilege to compliance audits done by non-lawyers, despite
arguments that a self-evaluative privilege would further Upjohn's
policies.218 Even when the attorney-client privilege applies as an initial
matter, corporations often find it difficult to maintain the privilege
when they disclose the results of internal investigations to

official to use a taxpayer-provided attorney to conceal from the taxpayers themselves
otherwise admissible evidence of financial wrongdoing, official misconduct, or abuse of
power.") (rejecting assertion by former Illinois Secretary of State of privilege for
communications with his chief legal counsel; federalism does not require a different result
for state government); In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("When government attorneys learn, through communications with their clients, of
information related to criminal misconduct, they may not rely on the government attorney-client privilege to shield such information from disclosure to a grand jury.") (rejecting
assertion of attorney-client privilege by an attorney in the Office of the President for legal
advice given to the president); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910,
925-26 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the White House has no attorney-client privilege or
work-product protection to withhold potentially relevant information from federal grand
jury). Contra In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 528-29, 535 (2d Cir. 2005)
(allowing former chief legal counsel in the office of the governor of Connecticut to assert
attorney-client privilege, in response to federal grand jury subpoena, with regard to
conversations with the governor and his staff, where communications would have been
protected from state subpoena under specific state statute and recognizing conflict with
other circuits).
217. In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920.
218. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Co., 214 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting privilege for pre-accident documents and enforcing Mine Safety and Health
Administration subpoena); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 391 (D. Md.
1994) (rejecting privilege for drug company's audits done by an outside consultant).
Compare Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 848, 865-66 (1994) (suggesting that some internal audits may not
be undertaken for fear of increasing the risk of corporate criminal and civil liability, and
arguing for a "modified 'evidentiary privilege' rule ... which prohibits prosecutors from
using voluntarily prepared corporate records against the corporation, while allowing such
records to be used against wrongful agents"), with Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel,
Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator,24 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
45, 64 (2007) (empirical study concluding that state law audit privilege shields have little
effect on compliance and that such laws "provide cover for corporate wrongdoing without
providing countervailing benefits in the form of increased self-policing or self-reporting").
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government agencies 219 or outside auditors, 220 or use internal
investigations as part of an effort to sway public perceptions about
the company. 221
Faced with pressures of their branch-office role, which requires
disclosure of the results of internal investigations to the government,
corporations have attempted to argue for a doctrine of "partial
waiver" so that they do not lose the privilege entirely where they
disclose information only to government investigators. Although
courts have acknowledged that permitting partial waivers might
increase the likelihood that corporations would engage in the selfpolicing that government agencies have been encouraging,22 2
nevertheless, courts have been unwilling to recognize that
government involvement should affect the waiver standard: "The
investigatory agencies of the Government should act to bring to light
illegal activities, not to assist wrongdoers in concealing the
information from the public domain." 223
219. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d
289, 291 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding waiver of privilege with regard to documents produced to
the Department of Justice and other governmental agencies).
220. See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 486, 488 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding
subpoena for memorandum and ethics review disclosed to outside auditor); In re Willkie,
Farr & Gallagher, No. M8-85(JSM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2927, at *7, *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 14, 1997) (finding that documents related to an internal investigation by a law firm
are protected by attorney-client privilege, but this privilege is waived when they are turned
over to accountants for the purpose of obtaining an audit opinion); cf. United States v.
Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that statements made to counsel for
disclosure to outside auditors are not protected) ("That he might regret those statements
after later learning of the subsequent corporate disclosure to law enforcement officials is
not material to the privilege determination...."); Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d
236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that accountants for targets of tax fraud investigation
were properly subpoenaed for documents because those documents were not provided to
accountants for the purpose of assisting with legal advice).
221. See In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(ordering disclosure of documents relating to preparation of internal investigation report
that corporation made public).
222. See In re Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp. Billing PracticesLitig., 293 F.3d at 303;
see also Katie M. True, Restricting Prosecutors'Powers: Increasing Oversight to Reinstate
Corporate Interests, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1542-47 (2007) (discussing federal court
approaches to waiver in the context of cooperation).
223. In re Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d at 303; see
also United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591, 602-03 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that "federal
courts of appeals have overwhelmingly disapproved of" selective waiver; allowing
selective waiver may not be necessary because a publicly traded company "remains under
a fiduciary duty to shareholders to investigate and eradicate fraudulent activity" and the
SEC has sufficient power to obtain information without the encouragement of a selective
waiver of the attorney-client privilege), affd in part and vacated in part,577 F.3d 1069 (9th
Cir. 2009). The Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States
considered a rule to allow selective waiver, but did not recommend it to Congress. See
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Finally, the corporate privilege has never protected the
individuals who have made disclosures to corporate counsel from
having the corporation disclose these communications. Courts have
long held that the privilege belongs to the corporation, not the
individual, and so the corporation has always been free to waive the
privilege and disclose the communications.224 Presumably, this rule
could inhibit the free flow of information to the corporation, at least
if an employee fully understands the rule when being questioned by
corporate counsel, but that has not led courts to restrict a
corporation's ability to play its branch-office role free of any control

by the errant employee. 225
The courts' approach to treating Upjohn narrowly may thus
reflect a convergence in the treatment of government and private
corporations in the area of attorney-client privilege. Recall the Justice
Department's approach to attorney-client waivers in the context of
non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements: in the words of
Deputy Attorney General McNulty, the corporation has a "quasipublic role" to promote "public trust and confidence." 226 The
government's expectation that a corporation engaged in a good faith
internal investigation will waive its attorney-client and work-product
Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Comm'n on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Senators Patrick J. Leahy and Arlen Specter 6 (Sept.
26, 2007) ("[P]rovision proved to be very controversial.") (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). When Congress subsequently approved the new Rule 502 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, an explanatory note was agreed to expressing congressional intent that
the new Rule 502(d) "does not provide a basis for a court to enable parties to agree to a
selective waiver of the privilege, such as to a federal agency conducting an investigation,
while preserving the privilege as against other parties seeking the information." See 154
CONG. REC. 7818-19 (2008).
224. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
(1985) (holding that the power to waive the privilege rests with corporate management);
United States v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing
several supporting cases).
225. Griffin argues the Thompson Memorandum's emphasis on waiver of the attorneyclient privilege put corporate counsel in an "untenable position" because counsel would
find it difficult to conduct an "honest investigation" knowing that this material "will likely
be ceded to the government." See Griffin, supra note 126, at 347. Corporate counsel have
always been in this position, however, because the privilege always belonged to the
corporation; the Thompson Memorandum just made it clearer to corporations that they
could benefit from waiving the privilege by playing the branch-office role. Cf. In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333, 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding corporate waiver of
privilege with regard to employee interviews in context of a pre-Thompson Memorandum
corporate investigation, despite attorneys' statement that they could represent employees
as well as the corporation as long as no conflict appeared; court warns counsel against
giving such "watered-down 'Upjohn warnings,' " noting the "potential legal and ethical
mine field" such warnings present during the investigation).
226. See supranote 1 and accompanying text.
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protections reflects the view that the corporation operates in this
public role and should have no interest in shielding information. Just
like the government, corporations should not use lawyers to keep
corporate activity out of public view.227
3. Constitutional Protections
The greatest legal difference between the public prosecutor and
the private corporation in the legal rules governing investigation of
business crime lies in the area of constitutional protections. The
Fourth Amendment places important restraints on the ability of
prosecutors to search for and seize evidence, even when that search
occurs in the workplace;22 8 the Fifth Amendment restricts the
methods used in questioning suspects. 229 By contrast, corporations
remain constitutionally unconstrained in their ability to search offices,
seize documents, review and monitor emails and voicemails, question
employees, and fire employees for failure to cooperate.230
As corporations have increasingly come to play the new branchoffice role in business crime investigations, commentators and courts
have begun to focus on the question of whether corporate conduct
should be subject to constitutional constraints. 23 1 Although

227. The concern that corporations might route communications through lawyers as a
way to keep them from government investigators is not an imaginary one. See Morgester
Declaration, supra note 34, at 4-5 n.6 ("In a January 20, 2006 e-mail, Hunsaker [H-P
attorney and chief ethics officer] ask [sic] Baskins [H-P general counsel] '[i]n order to
ensure that we can rely on privldge [sic] if anything ever comes of this, would you like me
to oversee the investigation ... ?' In a January 23, 2006 e-mail, Hunsaker further states
'Ann Baskins has asked me to oversee the investigation into this in order to protect the
attorney-client privilege in the event there is litigation or a governmental inquiry of some
sort.' ").

228. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches by government employers of workplace areas where
government employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy); Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364, 372 (1968) (holding the warrantless police seizure of employer's documents
in employee's office and in employee's custody violated employee's Fourth Amendment
rights); United States v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding warrantless
FBI search of office of city governmental agency violated the Fourth Amendment).
229. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966).
230. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) ("[T]he
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected
by a private party on his own initiative."); cf Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d
611, 619-20 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that constitutional protections may be relevant in
determining whether termination of an at-will employee violates state public policy).
231. Compare Griffin, supra note 126, at 352-53 (arguing corporate conduct should be
subject to constitutional constraints), with Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within
the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1634-46 (2007) (arguing against providing Fifth
Amendment protection to employees subject to workplace investigations).
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corporations engage in a variety of investigative practices, current
concern has focused on whether statements produced under threat of
firing should be considered coerced, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, and therefore inadmissible at trial, and whether
corporate refusal to advance attorneys' fees, done to obtain
prosecutorial leniency, should be found to violate an employee's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. The institutional shift to the branchoffice role does provide some factual support for applying the
Constitution to these corporate actions (and to other corporate
investigative conduct). On the other hand, a decision to
constitutionalize corporate investigations faces substantial doctrinal
objections and might not only undermine the ability of government
prosecutors to draw on the investigative efforts of private
corporations, but also reduce the ability of private companies to
undertake internal investigations.
The most obvious doctrinal issue is whether corporate conduct,
undertaken in its branch-office role, can be considered "government
action," for the constitutional protections available to parties
involved in the criminal process apply only to government action.
Although there are cases where courts have been willing to find that
private parties have been used as "instruments" of the prosecutor,
those cases involve clear and direct orders for specific private action,
often embodied in government regulations.2 32 Even in cases where
government interaction with private conduct is pervasive-public
utility regulation and self-regulation by the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD") under the federal securities laws, to
give two examples-courts have been unwilling to put the mantle of
government action on private actors.233
232. For example, in Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615-16, the Court held that a private railroad
company's testing of blood and urine of certain of its employees, pursuant to regulations
of the Federal Railroad Administration that authorized, but did not compel, such tests,
implicated the Fourth Amendment because there were sufficient "indices of the
Government's encouragement, endorsement, and participation" in the testing. See also
United States v. Montayne, 500 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that statements made
in the course of a lie detector test administered by employer at police request were subject
to the Fifth Amendment and that the private employer "was admittedly acting as an agent
for the police"); cf. United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972) (court need
not consider whether the Fifth Amendment might apply to foreign police officers'
interrogation of the suspect where U.S. police officers "simply used foreign police officials
as instruments" because foreign police officers had "an interest of their own" in
interrogating the suspect).
233. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974) (holding that private
electric utility's termination of customer was not "state action," even though the utility
was extensively regulated by the state, enjoyed some state protection from competition,
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Despite the courts' general unwillingness to expand
constitutional protection where private and public efforts are mixed,
the court of appeals in Stein was willing to find that the constant
interaction between government prosecutors and counsel for KPMG
over the payment of attorneys' fees and getting KPMG employees to
submit to government questioning gave rise to constitutional
protection. 234 The court pointed out that the government conveyed to
KPMG that "its survival depended on its role in a joint project with
the government to advance government prosecutions," which made
the government "legally responsible" for KPMG's conduct. 235 The
government argued that there could not have been state action
because an adversary of the government cannot be its partner.236
Although the court agreed that "[a]n adversarial relationship does
not normally bespeak partnership," it concluded that the existential
"threat of indictment was easily sufficient to convert the
government's adversary into its agent." 237
Whether this approach becomes a slippery slope to finding
government action when the government uses less obvious, but
equally effective, pressure remains to be seen.238 Unless future courts
confine Stein closely to its facts, however, a decision to expose to
constitutional constraint the broad range of governmentally
encouraged internal corporate compliance efforts would open up for
consideration a number of other difficult issues. It is perhaps not a
Pandora's box of problems, but at least a "Stein's box."

and had included the termination provision in its tariffs, which were subject to review by
state public utilities commission); D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279
F.3d 155, 163 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding actions by the Division of Enforcement of the
NASD, Inc., to compel member-firm employees to submit to interviews were not state
action for Fifth Amendment purposes; even though the Division had a "Criminal
Prosecution Assistance Unit" that assisted the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office in the
investigation in question, the unit is generally walled off from the NASD's regulatory
efforts and the particular interview request came directly from the Division of
Enforcement as a result of its private investigation, not from "governmental persuasion or
collusion"). For further discussion of the NASD cases, see Griffin, supra note 126, at 36869 (acknowledging that these cases "present the most significant obstacle to finding state
action in this arena"). The NASD cases are a particular obstacle to a finding of state
action in the case of private corporations in light of the legal position of the NASD, a selfregulatory agency established by federal law with the responsibility to investigate its
members' conduct and discipline them. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7), (h) (2006).
234. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 147-51 (2d Cir. 2008).
235. Id. at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. See id. at 151.
237. Id.
238. See Buell, supra note 231, at 1641.
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The problems would likely begin with statements that employees
make to corporate counsel (whether inside or outside counsel) in the
course of an internal investigation or compliance program. Stein
involved statements made to government investigators, but the
critical point was not the questioner but the compulsion to speak
being exerted on the employee. The compulsion was the threat of
discipline for failure to cooperate, discipline which could include
firing.239 The Supreme Court held in Garrity v. New Jersey240 that such
threats (which were made by the State) constitute a form of
compulsion that violates the Self-Incrimination Clause and makes the
resulting statements inadmissible at trial.241 Such threats, however, are
likely part of any compliance program.242 Indeed, the sentencing
guidelines require appropriate penalties if a compliance program is to
be considered "effective"24 3 and corporations would certainly be
remiss in not disciplining employees who fail to cooperate in such
efforts or who fail to reveal wrongdoing.
What problems might arise in placing such statements within
constitutional constraints? Recall the statements that executives from
Comverse made to corporate counsel investigating their options
backdating, discussed earlier.2" Presumably under Garrity these
statements would be inadmissible at their criminal trial, but could
they be used in the affidavit supporting their arrest warrants (which
they were)? If these statements led corporate counsel to find
particular documents, would those documents then be inadmissible at
trial as a fruit of the illegal activity (Garrity held that the immunity
provided is for use and derivative use245)? Could the executives be
fired? Presumably they could be fired for what they told corporate
counsel (the Self-Incrimination Clause protects only against use in the

239. See Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing KPMG's
pressure on two employees, one of whom was fired for failing to cooperate).
240. 385 U.S. 493 (1966).
241. See id. at 497-98. The court in Stein II relied on Garrity and its progeny for the
proposition that KPMG's conduct in conditioning the payment of legal fees on talking
with government agents could result in coerced statements that violate the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 327-28,
330-31 (applying test and suppressing statements).
242. See Garrett,supra note 215, at 939 (discussing how the failure to cooperate in an
internal investigation "would be proper grounds for termination").
243. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(6)(B) (2009).
244. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
245. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498-500; see United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004)
(stating that the Constitution "requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually
coerced statements").
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criminal process, not collateral effects246), but suppose they had
refused to cooperate? Although in Gardner v. Broderick the Court
pointed out that there is no constitutional violation if the government
fires or disciplines its employees for refusing to cooperate,247 courts
disagree on whether government employees must be told that
although statements made under threat of firing may not be used in a
criminal proceeding, the employee's refusal to answer questions may
be a basis for disciplinary action. 248 This raises the possibility that
corporate counsel's lack of clear explanation of an employee's
constitutional rights would prevent the corporation from taking
appropriate disciplinary action.249
Stein's box also opened Sixth Amendment issues. Normally, the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel does not attach until the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. 250 Despite the fact that
KPMG's pressure to deny advancement of fees, with its attendant
impact on the KPMG employees' ability to choose counsel, came
during investigation and before any charges were filed, the court of
appeals found a Sixth Amendment violation: "[w]hen the government
acts prior to indictment so as to impair the suspect's relationship with
counsel post-indictment, the pre-indictment actions ripen into
cognizable Sixth Amendment deprivations upon indictment."2 1 This

246. See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956) (rejecting claim that
the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege should be extended to cover the infamy
that might be incurred from being forced to testify).
247. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968) (holding an employee's dismissal
solely for his refusal to waive his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
unconstitutional, but stating that "[i]f appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official
duties, without being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his answers
or the fruits thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself, the privilege against selfincrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal") (internal citations omitted).
248. For a review of the split in the circuits on the content of the warnings to
employees, see Sher v. United States Veteran's Admin., 488 F.3d 489, 502-05 (1st Cir.
2007).
249. Constitutionalizing the internal investigation process would not likely require
corporate counsel to provide Miranda warnings for an employee's statements to be
constitutionally admissible in a criminal case because internal investigations would not
likely be considered custodial interrogation, the required setting for Miranda warnings.
See United States v. Montayne, 500 F.2d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that warnings not
required before employer-administered lie detector test because employee was not in
custody).
250. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
251. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 153 (2d Cir. 2008). The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel includes the right to counsel of one's choice, at least if the defendant can
pay for such counsel. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144-45 (2006);
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); cf. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States,
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is a potentially broad approach, however. Pre-charge investigative
proceedings in business crime proceedings may be the most critical in
terms of the ultimate outcome. If the constitutional harm is
"interfer[ing] with defendants' relationship with counsel and their
ability to mount a defense,"2 52 must corporations then permit their
employees to retain counsel in an investigation, particularly those
employees who are likely to be indicted and whose rights will
consequently "ripen?" Will they be able to discipline those who do?
Will they be able to suggest counsel? Will there be any obligation to
make resources available for counsel (this is what Stein requires, at
least in the factual context presented in the KPMG investigation25 3) ?
Not discussed in Stein, but potentially part of Stein's box, is the
impact on document production. Corporate counsel might very well
demand that an employee produce records of appointments or
expenses in the course of an internal investigation, documents which
will be turned over to prosecutors in the event that illegal conduct is
found. If these investigations are equated to government action, then
the compelled production of documents, like the compelled
production of testimony, may give rise to Fifth Amendment issues,
leading to complex problems of immunity and derivative use.254
Corporate counsel might also "seize" documents under an employee's
control (recall the emails in the Hewlett-Packard pretexting case,
discussed earlier255 ). This could raise the question of whether the
seizure infringes on an employee's Fourth Amendment rights, that is,
whether the employee's justifiable expectations of privacy were
infringed and whether the search and seizure was done

"unreasonably."256

491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (finding that the defendant has no constitutional right to use
funds for counsel that would otherwise be forfeited to the United States: "A defendant has
no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's money for services rendered by an
attorney. . . .").
252. Stein, 541 F.3d at 136.
253. See id. at 155-57.
254. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 40-42, 46 (2000) (dismissing indictment
as result of derivative use of immunized act of production).
255. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
256. For an example of the types of issues that can arise in such cases, see United States
v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that, although the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to his computer located in a private office,
and that his employer's IT officers acted as "de facto government agents" in making a
hard copy of his computer's hard drive, the search was not unreasonable because the
employer possessed common authority over the office and the workplace computer such
that it could validly consent to a search).
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It is possible, of course, to overdraw the parade of horribles that
might occur if the branch-office role leads to placing constitutional
constraints on corporate investigations. Courts have dealt with many
of these issues in the government context. Kastigar v. United StateS257
sets out the methods for avoiding derivative use of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence. 258 The government has still been able to discipline
its employees who do not cooperate in internal investigations, and so
would corporations; whatever warnings the courts end up requiring
for the government can simply be followed by corporate counsel.259
Courts have most often given wide berth to the government when it
compels production of documents; 26 0 presumably, corporations would
have similar latitude. Employee expectations of privacy would be no
different depending on who is doing the searching and courts have
been creative in crafting standards of reasonableness for searches in
which warrants and "neutral magistrates" are unavailable.26 1
It may be that the critical arguments over expanding
constitutional protections to corporate investigations do not relate as
much to worries about opening Stein's box as they do to institutional
concerns. The argument for this constitutional expansion rests,
ultimately, on the realization that corporations are being required to
take on a different institutional role, one with certain public duties.
The public quality of this new institutional role might then lead courts
to provide employees with the protections that the Constitution
provides for the exercise of public power. But not only is the textual

257. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
258. See id. at 460 (stating that the government's burden of proof "is not limited to a
negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of
the compelled testimony"). For an argument that Kastigar's procedures can readily be
used in the corporate context, see Griffin, supra note 126, at 375-76. But see Buell, supra
note 231, at 1644-45 ("The appearance of Kastigarin the firm context would abundantly
complicate matters.").
259. See United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 604 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the
content of Upjohn or "corporate Miranda"warnings).
260. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1976) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege protects only the act of production, not the
documents themselves, even if the documents contain incriminating information).
261. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989)
(upholding, as "reasonable," drug testing by urinalysis, without warrant or suspicion, for
those applying for certain positions with the U.S. Customs Service); New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 710-12 (1987) (permitting warrantless inspection, without probable cause, of
automobile junkyard pursuant to state statute permitting such inspections); Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03 (1981) (permitting warrantless administrative search, without
probable cause, of mine pursuant to Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, which set out
procedures for regular inspections).
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base in the Constitution for equating private corporations and public
government less than clear. Courts also need to be concerned with the
ways in which private corporations are institutionally different than
public prosecutors, such that the imposition of constitutional duties
would come at high cost.
The immediate cost to the criminal justice system from imposing
these duties on private companies is the substantial likelihood that
important evidence of criminal conduct may be lost to prosecutors
through corporate constitutional error, making the enforcement of
the criminal law in business crime cases far more difficult. The
problem of constitutional mistake exists on the prosecutor's side, of
course, but statutory and administrative controls exist for directing
the efforts of government prosecutors and minimizing mistakes. A
federal statute regulates the process for granting immunity, for
example; 262 the Justice Department uses a variety of tools, including
the US. Attorneys' Manual, to exert administrative control over the
ninety-three U.S. Attorneys Offices and its more specialized
prosecutorial divisions.263 There are no such administrative controls
on the numerous corporations operating in the United States today,
no central agency to review their conduct in undertaking corporate
investigations. Perhaps more importantly, private corporations still
have different incentives than public prosecutors, particularly if
corporate agents have been involved in illegal behavior. Giving
private corporations the power, in effect, to create immunized
testimony sets up the possibility that those directing the corporation
will provide "immunity baths" that make it impossible for the
government to prosecute corporate executives."* Indeed, it is for fear
of this result that courts have historically resisted arguments either
that private corporations have the power under federal law to create
immunized testimony265 or that defendants should be able to
immunize defense witnesses who would otherwise refuse to testify for
fear of criminal prosecution. 26

262. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (2006).
263. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 1-1.100, 3-2.100.
264. See Buell, supra note 231, at 1645 (discussing the possibility of immunity baths).
265. See United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 187 F. 232, 236-37 (E.D. Pa.
1911) ("[E]ach defendant could call the other, until they brought about an immunity of all
the defendants in the indictment .... Such a construction of the [statute] would result in
practically wiping out the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act.").
266. See United States v. Skilling, No. H-04-025, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42664, at *9-14
(S.D. Tex. June 23, 2006) (discussing cases in which courts have refused to grant witness
immunity to defense witnesses). Defense witness immunity has been granted in only one
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Institutionally, then, the power to prosecute, and the
responsibility for poor execution of that power, still reside in the
hands of public prosecutors who are ultimately politically accountable
for their successes and failures. Attempting to control corporate
behavior by requiring private corporations to follow constitutional
rules undercuts both prosecutorial power and prosecutorial
responsibility, for it gives private corporations power to direct the
development of public prosecutions and penalizes public prosecutors
for misconduct done by "agents" over whom they lack adequate
control.
Whatever direction the courts take in regard to
constitutionalizing corporate involvement in business crime
investigations will likely affect the development of prosecutorial
agency agreements. To the extent that corporations can investigate
unencumbered by constitutional restriction, prosecutors will have
incentives to enter into these agreements and make use of corporate
efforts. This will allow prosecutors to continue to take advantage of
the substantial efficiency benefits that these agreements offer. On the
other hand, the imposition of constitutional duties when prosecutors
get too involved with corporate investigations, as in Stein, might lead
prosecutors to become less explicit in revealing the reasons for why
they might decide to prosecute, a dubious result. Should courts move
to a position where the implicit incentives to undertake compliance
programs or internal investigations are considered sufficient to
impose constitutional duties on corporate efforts, there would then be
a substantial possibility that the government will abandon the use of
these important tools for detecting and preventing business crimes.
C.

Corporationsas ProperTargets of CriminalProsecution

The change in role for corporations in business crime cases not
only reflects the incentives that corporations and prosecutors face in
prosecuting these cases. It also reflects an increasing prosecutorial
unwillingness to see corporations as proper targets of criminal
prosecution, at least in cases involving major accounting fraud.
Corporations have come to be seen more as instruments than targets,
which helps validate prosecutors' decisions to provide greater
incentives for corporations to cooperate and assist in the

circuit. See Gov't of V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a court
can immunize a witness on behalf of a defendant in certain circumstances).
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prosecution. 267 Although acknowledging that corporate criminal
prosecutions might still be necessary, this choice is held out for rare
cases. James Comey, the former head of the Corporate Fraud Task
Force, put it this way:
There are some corporations that have a profoundly screwedup culture .... At some point we have to say, "Look, we need

to put you out of business. We need to hit you. We need to kill
you, because you're bad in your own right, and it also serves the
broader purpose of general deterrence."268
The unspoken implication of this view may be that corporate criminal
liability is inappropriate outside of this small range of cases.
A more general unwillingness to prosecute corporations can be
traced to a lingering uncertainty as to the wisdom of entity criminal
liability. Although entity criminal liability has long been accepted by
legislators and courts,269 commentators have frequently questioned its
utility, arguing that civil remedies are more efficient in controlling
corporate misconduct. 27 0 Practical outcomes increase the
attractiveness of academic theory. The current panoply of available
criminal remedies involve imposing some sort of financial penalty on
the organization, most obviously, a fine, but also, under the
sentencing guidelines, restitution, probation, and/or community
service.27 If the same outcomes can be obtained through either a
deferral or a non-prosecution agreement, without a full criminal
prosecution, what more is to be gained from bringing an actual
criminal prosecution?
Compounding the uncertainty about the wisdom of entity
liability is the problem of collateral damage. A criminal charge may
carry additional collateral sanctions that end up causing harm to
shareholders and employees, parties whom prosecutors view as
innocent. As we have seen, the poster-child for this undesirable
spillover is Arthur Andersen LLP, the only organization tried and
267. See Buell, supra note 231, at 1625-27 (discussing instrumentalist arguments for
entity liability).
268. Benjamin Weiser, Empathy Shapes a Prosecutor,a Past Victim of Violence and
Greed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at B1.

269. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492-94 (1909) (upholding
constitutionality of criminal liability for corporations under the Elkins Act); Harry First,
General Principles Governing Criminal Liability of Corporations, Their Employees and
Officers, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 5.02
(Otto Obermaier & Robert Morvillo eds., 1990) (reviewing history of criminal liability for
entities).
270. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
271. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B 1.1-1.3, 8D 1.1-1.4 (2009).
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convicted in the Enron era. Prosecutors are acutely aware that Arthur
Andersen subsequently went out of business and have come to fear
the possibility that a future corporate defendant might suffer a similar
fate.272
The final note of uncertainty in prosecuting entities involves
deterrence. Many prosecutors believe that the best deterrent is to
prosecute the responsible individuals and put them in jail, a point
somewhat subtly made by the shifts in language from the Holder
Memorandum to the Thompson Memorandum.27 3 Corporate
decisions, after all, are made by individuals, and these individuals are
thought to be more sensitive to spending time in jail than to any other
possible sanction. As one prosecutor put it, many individual
defendants have offered to pay higher fines to avoid jail or get a
shorter jail sentence, but "defendants never offer to spend more time
in jail in order to lower their fines." 274
Each of these arguments has some force, but there is some
danger in evaluating these arguments just in the context of the major
Enron era accounting fraud cases. Extrapolating from those cases to a
general view of whether organizations are appropriate subjects of

272. See Weiser, supra note 268 (describing interview with U.S. Attorney James
Comey discussing the loss of jobs after the Arthur Andersen prosecution, where he stated,
"[w]e do not want to swing at the wrongdoer and knock down 50,000 innocent people");
see also supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney General's press
conference relating to KPMG deferred prosecution agreement). There are times,
however, when even a non-prosecution agreement cannot stave off the demise of a firm
whose business has been adversely affected by its prior conduct. See Letter From Michael
J. Garcia, U.S. Att'y, S. Dist. of N.Y., to Robert B. Fiske & James P. Rouhandeh, Davis
Polk & Wardwell 2 (Mar. 26, 2007), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution
.agreements/pdfljenkinsgilchrist.pdf (memorializing non-prosecution agreement in which
the investigated law firm represented that "as a result of its financial difficulties," the
firm's offices had all been closed or would soon be closed); Nathan Koppel, How a Bid to
Boost Profits Led to a Law Firm's Demise, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2007, at Al (reporting
history of the investigation of Jenkens & Gilchrist that led to the dissolution and nonprosecution agreement).
273. See supranotes 116-18 and accompanying text; see also Has the Government Gone
Too Far in Its War on Corporate Crime?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB116224475563608109.html (quoting David Pitofsky, a former federal prosecutor
who had been responsible for the prosecution of Computer Associates International, Inc.,
for securities fraud related to its accounting practices, as saying, "[t]he simple truth is that
prosecutors don't actually want or need to prosecute corporations; they want to prosecute
responsible individuals").
274. Scott D. Hammond, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at the
Twentieth Annual Institute on White Collar Crime, Charting New Waters in International
Cartel Prosecutions 13 (Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
214861.pdf.
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criminal liability can miss some important aspects of corporate
criminal prosecutions.
For one, corporate criminal defendants are a varied lot, both by
type of offense involved and size of the organization. As data from
the U.S. Sentencing Commission indicate, federally prosecuted
organizations run the gamut of offenses. In 2007, for example,
organizational defendants were found in nearly twenty different
categories of criminal conduct, from fraud, to antitrust, to money
laundering, to environment, to drugs, to passport and immigration
violations. 275 Further, based on the culpability factors assessed in the
case of convicted organizations, they range in size from a few very
large organizations to many smaller ones.276 Cutting back on entity
liability based on the experience with any one group of corporations
may end up having quite disparate effects.
A second reason for caution in extrapolating from the Enron era
cases is that these cases have generally focused on the involvement of
very high-level management, including CEOs, CFOs, and corporate
presidents, with prosecutors "trading up" to convict these defendants
by making deals with lower level employees in return for testimony
regarding their superiors.277 But this is not necessarily the only pattern
for business crime cases. Other business crimes may very well involve
line operations in large, complex organizations where responsibility
for illegal activity can be far removed from high-level management.
Price fixing, for example, can be done by sales people in one division
of a multi-product firm;278 illegal foreign payments can be made by
275. See OrganizationsReceiving Fines or Restitution by Primary Offense Category and
Applicability of Chapter Eight Fine Guidelines, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N (2007),
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/Table51.pdf.
276. Organizations Sentenced Under Chapter Eight: Culpability Factors, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N (2007), http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/Table54.pdf (stating
that sixty-four percent of reporting sentenced corporations with involvement of
management in criminal conduct had fifty or fewer employees; nine percent had 1,000 or
more employees).
277. See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller & Thaddeus Herrick, Fastow Plea Deal May Boost
Cases Against Enron's Ex-CEOs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2004, at A3 (describing agreement
with Andrew Fastow, former CFO of Enron, to plead guilty and testify against former
Enron CEOs Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling; Fastow described as the government's
"biggest catch" so far); Allan Murray, Executives in Trouble Now Know to Sing, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 17, 2005, at A2 (discussing testimony of cooperating witness Scott Sullivan, former
CFO of WorldCom, which allowed the government to land its "biggest fish," Bernie
Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom).
278. For example, the DRAM price fixing prosecution has involved corporate
executives in various sales and marketing positions in various subsidiaries of larger firms.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Executives Indicted for Their Roles in the
DRAM Price-Fixing & Bid-Rigging Conspiracy, 1-3 (Oct. 18, 2006), http://www.justice
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foreign subsidiaries.279 Proposals that would limit organizational
liability only to cases of "pervasive culpability throughout all offices
and ranks" (as the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation
urged 280) may very well cut too broadly and miss a large range of cases
for which organizational criminal liability is appropriate.
A third reason for caution is that reliance on individual
prosecutions for deterrence has its own limitations. The preference
for individual liability over organizational liability carries with it two
assumptions: (1) guilty individuals will be convicted and (2) convicted
individuals will be adequately sanctioned for their crimes. Both
assumptions may be problematic.
There are a variety of obstacles to convicting individuals in
business crime cases. Some business crimes involve conduct that
occurs abroad (international cartels, for example), and it is often
easier to obtain jurisdiction over U.S. subsidiaries than foreign
executives. 28 1 Business crimes are often the product of organizational
effort. A low-level employee may engage in the actual act of
pollution, or fail to keep rodents from infesting food stocks, or accept
a large cash deposit from a customer without filing the required
report, or threaten a customer with a boycott.282 Prosecution of these

.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2006/219102.pdf (discussing charges against executives of
Samsung, Hynix America, Infineon Technologies, and Micron Technology).
279. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Akzo Nobel Acknowledges
Improper Payments Made by its Subsidiaries to Iraqi Government Under the U.N. Oil for
Food Program, Enters Agreement with Department of Justice (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2007/December/07_crm_1024.html
(describing improper
payments made by foreign subsidiaries to Iraqi government in connection with U.N. "Oil
for Food" program); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc.'s
Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribes and Agrees to Pay a $7.5 Million Criminal Fine
(Oct. 16, 2007), http://skaddenpractices.skadden.com/fcpa//attach.php?uploadFilelD=16
(discussing illegal payments by Korean subsidiary to government customers in China).
280. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285, 1300 (S.D. Ohio
1994) (entering judgment of acquittal against corporate co-conspirator and stating that the
government's proof problems were made "more difficult because three of the four named
defendants, and many potential witnesses, are foreign nationals beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court").
282. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 660-64 (1975) (dealing with rodent
infestation in food warehouses); United States v. Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 529-30 (4th Cir.
2001) (company employees discharged untreated wastewater directly into the municipal
sewer system in violation of Avion's discharge permit); United States v. Bank of New
England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 846-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (acceptance of reportable bank
transactions by bank teller who mistakenly thought the transactions were not reportable);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) ("Complex
business structures . .. make it difficult to identify the particular corporate agents
responsible for Sherman Act violations.").
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individuals, although legally possible, may be misplaced in light of the
fact that the individual's conduct is only a small part of a greater
organizational effort that produced the crime. On the other hand,
high-level managers can be difficult to convict if they maintain
sufficient distance from the illegal behavior to plead lack of
knowledge, and if witnesses who can testify otherwise have made
their own deals with prosecutors, making their testimony suspect in
jurors' eyes. A particularly egregious example of this latter
phenomenon is the acquittal of Richard Scrushy, former CEO of
HealthSouth, on accounting fraud charges, despite the testimony of
five former HealthSouth CFOs as to his involvement in the fraud.283
Jurors apparently found the testimony of Scrushy's involvement
"ambiguous" and questioned the credibility of the ex-CFOs.2 84
Even when individuals are convicted, sanctions may turn out to
be lower than optimal. As a historical matter, sanctions for
individuals in business crime cases have been viewed as too lenient,
particularly in terms of jail time, a trend that Congress and the
Sentencing Commission have tried to reverse, and with some
success.285 The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker,28
holding that judges are not required to follow the guidelines,
however, has increased the discretion of district court judges to
impose lighter sentences than the guidelines would have permitted.287
283. See Dan Morse et al., HealthSouth's Scrushy is Acquitted, WALL ST. J., June 29,
2005, at Al.
284. See id. (quoting one juror as saying "[o]f course it was proven that it was fraud at
the company," but finding insufficient evidence of Scrushy's involvement).
285. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1 § 4(d), 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046
(May 13, 1987) ("Under present sentencing practice, courts sentence to probation an
inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of certain economic crimes, such as
theft, tax evasion, antitrust offenses, insider trading, fraud, and embezzlement, that in the
Commission's view are 'serious.' If the guidelines were to permit courts to impose
probation instead of prison in many or all such cases, the present sentences would
continue to be ineffective."). For congressional increases in criminal penalties, see for
example, Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (increasing imprisonment from three-year maximum to ten-year maximum);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1106, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006) (increasing imprisonment
for securities fraud from a ten-year maximum to a twenty-year maximum). For a review of
some substantial sentences in Enron era high-profile fraud trials, see Cindy Perman,
White-Collar Sentences, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2006, at 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB116249356296511625.html (ranging from five years for Scott Sullivan to twentyfive years to life for Bernard Ebbers, both for WorldCom fraud).
286. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
287. Id. at 245-46; see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (holding that
sentence within the guidelines range is presumptively reasonable on appeal, although the
presumption may be overcome). For an example of the impact of Booker on sentencing in
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Although appellate courts have attempted to check excessively light
sentences,288 the Supreme Court has upheld a district court decision
disagreeing with basic Sentencing Commission policy decisionS289 and
a district court decision imposing probation where the guidelines
would have required substantial jail time, reminding appellate courts
that they are to review sentencing decisions under a deferential abuse
of discretion standard. 290 The difficulty of calibrating sanctions to
societal harm may also make it hard to impose economically optimal
sanctions. Efforts to fine guilty individuals, based on economic harm
multiplied by the chance of detection and conviction, may very well
lead to a fine that exceeds any particular individual's resources.291 In
such cases, only the organization's resources will be adequate.
Finally, abandoning entity liability in favor of individual liability
may perversely make it more difficult to convict individuals in
business crime cases because it would likely undermine the branchoffice role that corporations are now playing. Prosecutors need a
credible threat of criminal prosecution to induce corporations to
enter into these agency agreements. The weaker that threat, the less
likely it is that corporations will agree to such arrangements and the
business crime cases, see United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-01, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68281, at *44-45 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006) (sentencing defendant to a seventy-two-month
non-guidelines sentence after pre-Booker 292-month sentence was reversed by court of
appeals for post-Booker reconsideration).
288. A notable example is the tussle between the Eleventh Circuit and the trial judge
in the HealthSouth fraud prosecution, in which the trial judge continued to sentence
defendants to non-jail terms despite appellate court reversals, ultimately leading the
district court judge to recuse himself from further proceedings in the case. See United
States v. Livesay, 484 F.3d 1324, 1326-29 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007) (detailing prior history of
reversals and resentencings, including recusal); United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227,
1230 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing re-imposition of seven-day sentence of imprisonment);
United States v. McVay, 447 F.3d 1348, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting other "dramatic" and
"extraordinary" departures by trial judge).
289. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 585, 591 (2007) (holding that because
the distinction in the guidelines between crack and powder cocaine is advisory only, a nonguidelines sentence based on disagreement with the distinction could be reasonable).
290. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 538, 541 (2007) (holding that courts of appeals
must review sentences "under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard" and upholding,
as reasonable, a sentence of probation in a case where the guidelines would have required
thirty months imprisonment).
291. For a list of corporate antitrust fines in excess of $100 million, whose amount is
based on the harm caused, see Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Presentation at the 56th Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA Section of
Antitrust Law: Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust Division's
Criminal Enforcement Program .12 (Mar. 26, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/232716.pdf. For discussion of the fines imposed against participants in the
vitamins cartel, see Harry First, The Vitamins Case: CartelProsecutionsand the Coming of
InternationalCompetition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711,715-18 (2001).
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weaker such arrangements are likely to be with respect to the
corporation's obligations. To the extent that one views this new
branch-office role as critical to the successful investigation and
prosecution of business crime, one should be cautious about cutting
back on organizational criminal liability.
D. Deterrence

A major goal of the criminal sanction, even if not the only goal, is
deterrence. 2" Assuming that both individual and organizational
criminal liability are necessary for adequate deterrence, an important
question is how the corporation's new branch-office role might affect
the willingness of individuals or entities to engage in business crime.
Any effort to assess the effect on deterrence of placing
corporations in an agency role must begin with an acknowledgment of
our limited understanding of how deterrence actually works in the
area of business crime.293 As an initial matter, economic theory, which
has paid some attention to the theory of optimal deterrence, should
be well-suited to making predictions about the effect of various
sanctions on the deterrence of business crimes.294 Economic theory is
premised on rational profit-seeking and the effect of incentives on
behavior; crimes committed by people operating in a business setting
would seem to be the exact type of behavior amenable to this
approach. Nevertheless, economic theory has tended to ignore
behavioral complications, such as persistent underestimation of the
risk of being caught for illegal behavior,295 as well as the effect of
social norms and social interactions on the willingness of people to

292. For discussion of the deterrence function and the blaming function of corporate
criminal liability, see Buell, supra note 5, at 491-526.
293. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, On the Prospects of Deterring Corporate Crime,
2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 25, 27-28 (2007).
294. See, e.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 172-205 (1968) (discussing application of optimal deterrence theory to crime
generally); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 652, 661-72 (1983) (dealing with the application of optimal deterrence theory to
antitrust).
295. See Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of
Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still Go to Prison?, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ANTITRUST 81, 95 (Vivek Goshal & John Stennek eds., 2007); Christine Jolls, On Law
Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 273-78 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005)
(discussing optimism bias and availability bias as leading to underestimation of risk of
being caught).
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engage in illegal business behavior. 296 Although economic theory is a
powerful tool, and can provide particular help in predicting the effect
of incremental changes in criminal justice policy, it should be used
with an appreciation that factors beyond rational self-interest can
have an important role in ensuring lawful behavior.2
Compounding the difficulty of understanding how deterrence
works is the fact that there are two different types of actors to be
deterred from committing business crimes: individuals and
organizations. Neo-classical economic theory treats the firm as
equivalent to the individual, that is, as just another rational actor. As
rational actor, with the proper external incentives (specifically, fines
set at an "optimal" level) organizations will behave efficiently,
adopting whatever internal measures are necessary to monitor and
control their agents' behavior, perhaps more efficiently than the
government can with the threat of imprisonment and without the
need for government to dictate how the organization should achieve
its ends.298
Organization theory, on the other hand, addresses itself to the
organizational quality of corporate conduct, looking to organizational
process as an explanation for how organizations behave and react.299

296. See PAUL OMEROD, CRIME: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
44-48 (2005). A good example is the widespread backdating of stock options among hightechnology firms in Silicon Valley, where the practice was described as "routine" and
where the companies and the law firms and accounting firms that advised them seem to
have "duped themselves into thinking they were doing this for the benefit of the
stockholders" and considered backdating a "victimless crime." See Gary Rivlin & Eric
Dash, Haunted by a Heady Past, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at C1 (quoting executive
compensation specialist who has worked with "scores" of Silicon Valley firms; includes
map showing location of involved firms).
297. Cf Nuno Garoupa & Frank H. Stephen, Law and Economics of Plea-Bargaining
14-20 (July 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=917922#PaperDownload (expressing skepticism at a law and economics view
of plea bargaining which does not take account of the institutional setting in which
bargains are made and which might undercut the efficiency hypothesis).
298. See Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supra note 295, at 114-15. Although some argue that
corporate criminal liability under a respondeat superior rule is likely to result in overdeterrence and other perverse effects, given that monitoring alone can never eliminate all
violations, see Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 707-09, other constraints on
prosecution may moderate this effect, assuming that it, in fact, exists, see Richard A.
Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1776-77 (2005).
299. See GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILLIP ZELIKOw, ESSENCE OF DECISION:
EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 143-96 (Longman 1999) (1971) (explaining
different theoretical approaches to organizational behavior); Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supra
note 295, at 85 (explaining how "team properties of cartels," including agency problems
within limited liability organizations, affect design of optimal sanctions); Barry D.
Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations,71 B.U. L.
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Organization theory suggests that organizations may be slow to
change internal processes and that outside intervention may be
necessary to change organizational process. * The proper policy
prescription, then, should be directed at changing internal operating
procedures and mandating procedures that lead to lawful
organizational behavior.
There is little empirical support to favor one approach over the
other. Prosecutions and penalties for cartel price fixing, for example,
have increased steadily in the past decade, but how much (or even
whether) these sanctions have deterred price fixing is unclear.301 On
the other hand, since 1991 the Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations have provided clear incentives for adopting compliance
programs, but there is no evidence as to the effectiveness of these
programs in deterring corporate crime." United States Sentencing
Commission data indicate that convicted corporations almost never
have compliance programs,30 3 but no one can say whether this means
that corporations with effective programs are less likely to commit
crimes in the first place, whether the data reflect the fact that most
convicted organizations are small (formal compliance programs are

REV. 341, 346-74 (1991) (discussing organizational structures and difficulties in controlling
and incentivizing agents).
300. See ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 299, at 280 (stating that actions at "Time 2"
are likely to resemble actions at "Time 1").
301. See JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING (2d ed. 2007) (reviewing

international cartel prosecutions and arguing that profits from collusion have exceeded
fines imposed); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High do Cartels Raise Prices?
Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513, 533-64 (2005) (based on
survey of social science literature describing serious cartels, arguing that sentencing
guidelines' estimate of cartel overcharges is too low).
302. See Short & Toffel, supra note 218, at 47 (literature on compliance programs and
self-reporting "is largely theoretical; little empirical evidence exists to suggest what mix
most effectively encourages self-policing"); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Drifting Down the
Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance
Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 684 (2004)
(arguing there are "no useful data" about whether compliance programs prevent crime or
reduce the chance of prosecution if crime is detected).
303. In Fiscal Year 2007, for example, only one of the eighty-nine sentenced
organizations for which the Commission had information reported that it had an effective
compliance program. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL

SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.54 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/
Table54.pdf; cf U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.54 (2006) [hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 2006], available

at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/Table54.pdf
organizations had a compliance program).

(reporting none of 108 sentenced
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ill-adapted to small organizations3 0), or whether corporate managers
do not believe in their utility (judges, for example, do not routinely
impose compliance programs on convicted corporations30 ).
Recognizing the limits of theory to predict outcomes should
make us cautious in attempting to assess the overall effect on
deterrence of the branch-office role. Nevertheless, within those limits,
even if it is not possible to determine what sanctions, or combination
of sanctions, are optimal, it is possible to make arguments about the
likely incremental effects that this new role might have on
organizational and individual incentive structures.
On the one hand, the branch-office role does lead to an increase
in information about illegal behavior, information that is shared with
prosecutors. This clearly has been the result, for example, in antitrust
amnesty programs.306 This increase in information makes detection
and successful prosecution of business crimes more likely. To the
extent that actors (individual or organizational) take any account of
the risks in undertaking illegal behavior, whether accurately or not,
increasing the risk of detection and successful prosecution should
raise the expected cost of illegal behavior and consequently lower its
incidence on the margin. Further, the increase in information may
increase the chances of bringing successful civil suits against the
corporation; this, too, may increase deterrence by making illegal
behavior more costly.
On the other hand, this increased deterrent effect might be offset
by two other aspects of the branch-office role: (1) the reduction in
penalty for the reporting corporation and (2) a potential institutional
change on the part of prosecutors.
A key aspect of today's branch-office role is that it takes a "fix-itafter" approach. That is, organizations are allowed to violate the law
one time, so long as they promise to assist in investigating individual
wrongdoers and then fix the problem by undertaking a variety of
internal reforms, paying restitution, and, often, but not always, paying

304. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2009) (discussing
how "small organizations" can meet guidelines' requirements with less formality and
fewer resources).
305. In 2007, judges ordered the institution of compliance programs for fewer than
twenty-five percent of sentenced organizations. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SOURCEBOOK

OF FEDERAL SENTENCING

STATISTICS

tbl.53

(2007),

available at

http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdflarticles/2007/Apr2007/document03.pdf.
306. See Hammond, supra note 274, at 13-15 (discussing benefits of amnesty program
in major cartel prosecutions).
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a fine. 0 Criminal charges are not pursued, an outcome that
organizations obviously prefer, which is why they enter into these
agreements in the first place. This means that corporations have
determined that the cost of these agreements is lower than the
expected cost of a criminal conviction. Reducing the cost of illegal
behavior, however, makes the behavior more profitable and makes it
more likely that the organization will engage in it in the first place.308
It may be, however, that it is the first offense with which we need
to be most concerned in organizational crime. United States
Sentencing Commission data indicate that organizations are rarely
repeat offenders, or, at least, they are rarely prosecuted more than
once." This would indicate that, for whatever reason, deterrence
(more precisely, specific deterrence) may work well for
organizational offenders after the first offense. But lowering the cost
of a first offense might very well increase the incidence of first
offenses, indeed, may lead organizations to be lax in their internal
controls in ways that will be difficult for prosecutors to detect ex post.
Although it is not possible to know whether the negative effects
swamp the positive effects, the first-offense concern serves as a
caution in structuring a system that too readily rewards corporations
for undertaking the branch-office role.
A second aspect of the branch-office role, particularly in the
corporate fraud area, is its institutional effect on prosecutors. As
discussed above, prosecutors may be moving toward a view that
corporations are not generally a proper target for criminal
prosecution. Indeed, the use of agency agreements provides
prosecutors with an attractive middle option between declination and
litigation, offering the possibility of an easier (that is, less costly) way
for prosecutors to resolve high-profile cases. This increases
prosecutors' incentives to employ these agreements, with the
307. See Letter from Leslie R. Caldwell, Director, Enron Task Force, U.S. Dep't of
Justice,
to
Robet
Morvillo
&
Charles
Stillman
(Sept.
17,
2003),
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/merill2003.pdf (setting out terms of
non-prosecution agreement but not imposing any corporate fine).
308. The possibility that a fix-it-after approach will reduce deterrence may be lessened
for crimes such as price fixing, where a co-conspirator might defect from the agreement
and disclose its behavior to the prosecutor, thereby depriving the other conspirators of
amnesty for their fines. See, e.g., Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supra note 295, at 107-08
(discussing various deterrence effects); Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and
Antitrust, 82 TEx. L. REv. 515, 520-680 (2004) (providing an in-depth exploration of the
defection problem in price fixing cartels).
309. See FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 2006, supra note 303 (stating that 99.1%
of convicted organizations had no prior record of committing similar acts within the
previous ten years).
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increased risk that the effectiveness of these agreements will diminish
as defense lawyers and corporations discount the risk of an actual
prosecution occurring. This, in turn, may further diminish the ex ante
deterrent effects that these agreements now present.1 o
The possibility that deterrence can be lost if prosecutors too
easily enter into agency agreements, and are too reluctant to bring
criminal prosecutions, can be seen in the case of Arthur Andersen.
The Andersen case, of course, is commonly seen now as the Justice
Department's great mistake, an innocent company wrecked by an
unproved criminal charge, with great losses to innocent employees
and partners plus collateral damage to the economy through the loss
of competition in the auditing market.31' This case now hangs over
Justice Department decision-making, as shown in the attorney
general's reasons for entering into an agency agreement with KPMG.
Another Arthur Andersen case, however, tells a different story.
Between 1989 and 1990 Arthur Andersen was involved in the sale of
partnership interests in a multi-building development in downtown
Hartford, Connecticut, known as Constitution Plaza.3 12 The project
was being developed by Colonial Realty, a large real estate developer
for whom Andersen had worked for many years."' After the
projected profits in the project failed to materialize, the Andersen
accountant and auditor involved in promoting the investments made
false statements to numerous potential investors about the project's
profitability.314 Colonial subsequently failed.3 ' The Justice
Department brought a criminal prosecution against the accountant
involved in the deceptive promotion. He was convicted on ten counts
of mail fraud and six counts of wire fraud. 316
310. The deterrence calculus is further complicated by the possibility that agency
agreements free up resources for other investigations, with an increased effect on overall
deterrence. See Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supranote 295, at 108.
311. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS
REGULATION, supra note 162, at 73 (discussing "substantial losses to society" from
Arthur Andersen prosecution); Howard H. Chang & David S. Evans, The Optimal
Prosecution of Corporate Fraud: An Error Cost Analysis 5 (Nov. 1, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=943035#PaperDownload
("Arthur Andersen's fate emphasized the well-known fact that prosecutors can make
mistakes with tremendous and irreversible costs.").
312. See George Gombossy & Patricia Weiss, Behind the Money: Accounting for
Colonial'sFortunes,HARTFORD COURANT, June 1, 1992, at Al (describing the project).
313. See id.
314. See United States v. Autuori, No. 3:96-CR-161, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22782, at
*6-42 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 1998).
315. See Gombossy & Weiss, supranote 312.
316. See United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming
convictions).
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Arthur Andersen was not criminally prosecuted for its role in
Colonial's collapse. In April 1996 (prior to the accountant's
indictment) the U.S. attorney for Connecticut announced a
settlement in which Andersen agreed to pay $10.3 million to investors
in the Constitution Plaza syndication.3 17 Andersen agreed to provide
"full cooperation" in the investigation, including encouraging
Andersen employees to cooperate and providing all nonprivileged
documents relevant to the investigation. 318 Andersen did not admit
liability,3 19 and the government did not file any charging document.320
The U.S. attorney's reasons for entering into this agreement should
sound familiar: 1) the allegations were not firm-wide; 2) the
indictment would cause "significant collateral consequences to many
innocent Andersen employees"; 3) Andersen agreed to cooperate in
the investigation; and 4) Andersen agreed to make restitution.32 1
The Colonial Realty problems were not the last ones that Arthur
Andersen had, of course. Rather, Colonial Realty was the first in a
series of ever-larger frauds involving Andersen's accounting practices.
Next came Waste Management, McKesson, Sunbeam, the Baptist
Foundation, and eventually, Enron, leading to Andersen's
317. See Press Release, U.S. Att'ys Office, Dist. of Conn. 1 (Apr. 23, 1996),
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/andersen.pdf.
318. See id. at 1.
319. See Letter Agreement from Edwin J. Gale, Acting U.S. Att'y, Dist. of Conn.,
supranote 128, at 2.
320. Commentators have classified this agreement as a deferred prosecution
agreement, see Finder & McConnell, supra note 107, at 36 app., but it is not. By its terms,
the government agreed to defer investigation, not prosecution. See Letter Agreement
from Edwin J. Gale, Acting U.S. Att'y, Dist. of Conn., supra note 128, at 2. No charging
document was filed with the agreement and the government agreed to terminate its
investigation by formal letter in ninety days, so long as Andersen was cooperating. See id.
at 3.
321. See Press Release, U.S. Att'ys Office, Dist. of Conn., supra note 317, at 3. There
were other agreements as well. In 1993, Andersen also agreed to pay $3.5 million to the
state of Connecticut; of this amount, $2.5 million was for fees and interest that it earned
for work on eighteen Colonial Realty investment partnerships (this money was refunded
to investors), $100,000 was a civil penalty, and $900,000 was to cover the costs of
Connecticut's investigation and administration of the settlement. Andersen denied that it
violated any laws, but agreed to a one-year ban on new contracts with the state and
promised to adopt more stringent rules on gifts that its accountants could receive (Arthur
Andersen accountant, Edmond Autuori, had apparently received various gifts from
Colonial). See Accounting Concern to Pay $3.5 Million to Settle Realty Case, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1993, at B6. In 1999 Andersen agreed to a $90 million settlement of federal and
state private civil litigation involving 6,800 investors who claimed that they were
defrauded by Andersen's accounting practices involving Colonial. Andersen "denied
wrongdoing" and said that it agreed to the settlement "to keep the case from dragging on
another decade." See Sued Accountants to Pay $90 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1999, at
B7.
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prosecution for obstruction of justice and to the dissolution of the
firm. 322
The fuller Arthur Andersen story is at least a cautionary tale
about how easy it can be for prosecutors to accept an agency
agreement in place of a prosecution. But it also helps to illustrate the
point that deterrence can be lessened if prosecutors are too willing to
accept fix-it-after remedies that do not impose sufficiently strong
requirements to force the organization to take steps to avoid future
acts of wrongdoing. Andersen's willingness to sacrifice one of its
employees-"throwing the accountant under the bus," in current
lingo-did not convince either Arthur Andersen or its partners to
stop engaging in illegal behavior. Eventually, its persistently improper
behavior contributed to the prosecutorial decision to charge the firm
with obstruction in the Enron case.323 At that point one would be
hard-pressed to argue that the firm should get yet another fix-it-after
deal.
Arthur Andersen offers one last point relevant to the deterrence
issue and that relates to the question of collateral impact of a criminal
prosecution. No doubt the ultimate failure of Andersen was costly to
Andersen's partners and employees, but the full social cost, and the
impact on deterrence, is more complicated. The major asset of a
service firm is human capital, and Andersen's bankruptcy did not
affect its human capital or its value. Indeed, Andersen employees
were much sought after by other accounting and auditing firms when
Andersen was in the process of dissolving.3 24 True, there is one fewer
major accounting and auditing firm, reducing the market from five
major firms to four.3 25 Antitrust policy, however, is as much to blame
for the concentration in this market (assuming that the market
concentration adversely affects competition), for the federal antitrust
agencies did not object to the mergers that formed these major firms
in the first place.326 Indeed, federal antitrust enforcement agencies
today are unlikely to challenge a merger that reduces concentration in
322. See Jonathan D. Glater, Lone Ranger of Auditors Fell Slowly Out of Saddle, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at C5 (reviewing cases).
323. See Brickey, supra note 88, at 922-28.
324. See David Reilly, How a Chastened KPMG Got by Tax-Shelter Crisis, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 15, 2007, at A16 (describing competition among accounting firms, including
KPMG, to convince Arthur Andersen partners to join these firms).
325. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED
STUDY

ON

CONSOLIDATION

AND

COMPETITION

11

fig.2

(2003),

available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf.
326. See id. at 10-19 (reviewing mergers since 1980 that have resulted in the "Big 8"
becoming the "Big 4" and have led to increased concentration in the industry).
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a market from five major firms to four, believing that most of these
mergers are unlikely to result in a lessening of competition.327 We
should not assume, then, that competition necessarily suffered from
Andersen's demise.
To generalize from the Arthur Andersen experience, closer
attention to collateral consequences indicates that there may be less
to fear from bankruptcy (as assets are redistributed to existing or new
firms, hopefully to be used in more productive ways328) and more to
be gained in deterrence if firms know that firm failure will not enter
into a prosecutor's calculus in determining whether to bring a
criminal case. The benefits of such increased deterrence could swamp
the private costs to the owners of a corporation that engages in illegal
behavior. Certainly this would have been true had a stronger
prosecutorial effort in the Colonial Realty case changed Arthur
Andersen's behavior before it went on to commit ever-larger frauds.
E.

Conclusion

The movement to impose the branch-office role on public
corporations is not likely to be rolled back. The agency relationship
forged in recent years has too many benefits both for the prosecution
and the corporation. These private benefits translate into benefits for
the public interest, increasing the chances of successful prosecutions
327. See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of
Justice, Address Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting: From Dead
Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks figs.7 & 8 (Apr. 24, 2002),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/fig7.pdf and http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/fig8.pdf (showing that most merger challenges are for 3-2 mergers, that is, where
the merger involves two of the three largest firms in the market). Technically, merger
enforcement focuses on concentration in a market, as measured by the HerfindahlHirschman Index ("HHI"), rather than on market rank. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE

COMM'N, HORIZONTAL

MERGER GUIDELINES

§ 5.3

(2010), available at

http://www.justice.gov/ atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. Enforcement agency statistics
indicate that most recent merger challenges involve markets with a post-merger HHI
above 2400, with most challenges exceeding 3000. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, MERGER CHALLENGES DATA, FISCAL YEARS 1999-2003 tbl.1 (Dec. 18, 2003),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/201898.htm. The enforcement agencies did not
challenge the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand, which reduced
the number of major audit firms from six to five and increased the HHI to approximately
2200. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 325, at 12, 21 fig.5. The HHI for
the audit market in 2002, after the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, was 2566. Id. at 18-19.
328. One study did indicate that in the immediate aftermath of Arthur Andersen's
conviction audit fees increased as the industry became more concentrated, but the study
was unable to determine the effects of increased concentration after 2002 when SarbanesOxley imposed new auditing requirements. See Emilie R. Feldman, A Basic Quantification
of the Competitive Implications of the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 29 REV. INDUST. ORG.
193,196-97 (2006).
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in business crime cases. The existence of such public benefits counsels
strongly in favor of not altering certain legal rules implicated in this
agency relationship. Thus, as this Part has argued, courts should not
review the fairness of the terms of these agency agreements, not
provide stronger attorney-client protections for corporate
communications, and not impose constitutional restrictions on
corporate investigations.
The adoption of a partnering role for the public corporation,
however, should not obscure the importance of corporate criminal
liability in deterring business crime. As this Part has pointed out, the
prosecution of culpable individuals is not sufficient deterrence for
complex organizational crime. It may prove hard to prosecute and
convict culpable individuals; sanctions might not be effective to deter
them; and sanctions against particular individuals may be suboptimal
when their conduct produces large economic gains that inure to the
benefit of their organization. Corporate criminal prosecutions have
been used in many different types of business crimes, even where
criminal conduct has not been pervasive in the organization and even
in the absence of involvement by high-management officials.
Although prosecutors might worry about the collateral consequences
of corporate prosecutions, prosecutors also need to be worried about
not bringing such cases. As Arthur Andersen's conduct shows, the
consequence to the public of lost deterrence from not bringing a case
can be far greater than the consequence to the stakeholders from
going forward with a criminal prosecution against the enterprise.
Corporations might make good branch offices, but prosecutors need
to choose the agency relationship with careful attention to the danger
of undermining overall deterrence.
CONCLUSION
The Article has described an important, if gradual, change in the
role of the public corporation in the criminal process, from potential
criminal target to branch office of the prosecutor whose role it is to
partner with prosecutors in investigating and prosecuting business
crimes. Beginning with the SEC's efforts in the early 1970s through
the Justice Department's prosecutions in the Enron era, the Article
has shown how prosecutors' use of agency agreements (amnesty, nonprosecution agreements, and deferred prosecution agreements), along
with the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, have created
incentives for corporations to carry out this role. This change in role
is not yet complete and not without controversy. Corporations are
still prosecuted criminally; and courts, Congress, and commentators
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have sometimes been critical of the government's efforts to get
corporations to play the branch-office role. Even with the Justice
Department's now more cautious view of what it expects corporations
to do, however, there has been no change in the basic incentives that
corporations have to cooperate in business crime investigations.
The Article has also explored the implications of this role for
criminal justice policy. The major concern over the branch-office role
is how it will affect deterrence in business crime cases. Reliance on
the branch-office role and agency agreements could reduce
deterrence if prosecutors too willingly substitute partnering in place
of criminal prosecution. For one, the fix-it-after quality of agency
agreements reduces the cost of the first violation, which might be the
most important business crime violation to deter. For another, too
easy willingness to enter into these agreements may end up reducing
their effectiveness. A corporation's desire to accept onerous agency
obligations hinges on the credibility of the threat to bring a criminal
prosecution. There must be more than a bluff to call.
The criminal sanction against corporations is an important one in
business crime cases. We should not lessen its use on the assumption
that agency agreements can achieve the same goals as a criminal
prosecution, or on the assumption that the collateral consequences of
corporate prosecutions are so high that we should generally avoid
bringing criminal charges against corporations. Entity criminal
liability is now used in a wide variety of crimes and is particularly
important in cases where individual sanctions are unlikely to achieve
optimal deterrence. If the end result of the new branch-office role is
that criminal prosecutions of corporations become rare, we may find
ourselves back in the position that concerned Senator Sherman in
1890, where public corporations "do not care about your criminal
statutes aimed at their servants" and do not "feel the power of
Government."3 29 Use of the power of government, in the form of
corporate criminal prosecutions, should continue to be an important
tool for deterring business crime violations.

329. See supra note 2.

